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Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) are used to monitor and control critical infrastructure 
such as electricity and water. ICS were originally stand-alone systems, but are now widely 
being connected to corporate national IT networks, making remote monitoring and more 
timely control possible. While this connectivity has brought multiple benefits to ICS, such 
as cost reductions and an increase in redundancy and flexibility, ICS were not designed for 
open connectivity and therefore are more prone to security threats, creating a greater 
requirement for adequate security engineering approaches.  
The culture gap between developers and security experts is one of the main challenges of 
ICS security engineering. Control system developers play an important role in building 
secure systems; however, they lack security training and support throughout the 
development process. Security training, which is an essential activity in the defence-in-
depth strategy for ICS security, has been addressed, but has not been given sufficient 
attention in academia. Security support is a key means by which to tackle this challenge 
via assisting developers in ICS security by design. 
This thesis proposes a novel framework, the Industrial Control System Security 
Engineering Support (ICS-SES), which aims to help developers in designing secure control 
systems by enabling them to reuse secure design patterns and improve their security 
knowledge. ICS-SES adapts pattern-based approach to guide developers in security 
engineering, and an automated planning technique to provide adaptive on-the-job security 
training tailored to personal needs.   
The usability of ICS-SES has been evaluated using an empirical study in terms of its 
effectiveness in assisting the design of secure control systems and improving developers’ 
security knowledge. The results show that ICS-SES can efficiently help control system 
designers to mitigate security vulnerabilities and improve their security knowledge, 
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reducing the difficulties associated with the security engineering process, and the results 
have been found to be statically significant.   
In summary, ICS-SES provides a unified method of supporting an ICS security by design 
approach. It fosters a development environment where engineers can improve their security 
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This chapter introduces the research problem and formulates the thesis statement and 
research questions. The chapter is divided into the following sections: Section 1.1 
gives the motivation for this research. Section 1.2 discusses the research problem. 
Section 1.3 formulates the thesis hypothesis. Section 1.4 defines the research 
questions. Section 1.5 presents the objectives. Section 1.6 defines the success criteria. 
Section 1.7 highlights the thesis contributions to the current literature. Section 1.8 
outlines the structure of this thesis, providing an overview for each chapter. 
1.1. Motivation   
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are used for controlling critical infrastructure such 
as water and waste water, electricity, oil and natural gas (Stouffer et al., 2011). 
Initially, ICS were isolated systems in physically secure areas (Stouffer et al., 2011). 
Since these systems are now being widely connected to IT networks so as to use web 
applications and services to remotely monitor and control ICS data, the possibility of 
ICS security vulnerabilities and incidents have been significantly increased, creating 
a greater need to secure and adequately protect these systems (Stouffer et al., 2011).   
Recent incidents such as the Stuxnet attack, which disrupted a uranium fuel 
enrichment plant in Iran (Creators, 2013), and the Slammer worm, which disabled a 
nuclear power plant in Ohio (Collins and McCombie, 2012), have shown that control 
systems are vulnerable when not sufficiently secured. ICS attacks can cause serious 
effects to the economy and even to human lives (Stouffer et al., 2011). These attacks 
show the limitations of current ICS security engineering and vulnerability detection 
(Kargl et al., 2014). A rigorous research on security approaches and technologies is 
required in response to the dramatic increase in the number of cyber security threats 
to critical systems (Abouzakhar, 2013). 
There are several factors that can play important roles in securing control systems 
(Stouffer et al., 2011). Applying security throughout the system development cycle 
can reduce the possibility of producing security vulnerabilities (Lemaire et al., 2014). 




weaknesses in control systems, as recommended by the defence-in-depth strategy 
(Stouffer et al., 2011). Knowledge management and training competencies were 
identified as key requirements and features in improving ICS security (Hentea, 2008) 
(Steven, 2006).  
In this thesis, a novel supported framework, Industrial Control System Security 
Engineering Support (ICS-SES), was proposed with the intention of providing a 
mechanism to support a control system security by design approach. The framework 
is based on security patterns, which capture security expertise in the form of reusable 
solutions and an automated planning technique for providing tailored training. These 
techniques, if adopted, can provide effective help in designing secure control 
systems.  
1.2. Problem Statement 
The problem being addressed in this research is that industrial control systems lack 
security engineering. Although developing secure ICS has been the interest of many 
researchers in both industry and academia (Drias et al., 2015) (Axelrod, 2011) 
(Kunsman et al., 2015), there is a knowledge gap within control system security 
engineering research, and more effort is needed, in particular, in the area of ICS 
security by design (Hadziosmanovic et al., 2012).  
While there are some tools that have been developed to support ICS security, such as 
CSET in reference (ICS-CERT) and AVATAR in reference (Pedroza et al., 2011) for 
SYSML designers, current tools do not focus on the security awareness and learning 
aspect (Foo et al., 2013). 
The culture gap between ICS developers and security experts can be bridged by a 
pattern-based security engineering approach (Stouffer et al., 2011). However, current 
research lacks practical guidance on selecting and applying security patterns into 
control system development processes (Nguyen et al., 2014).  
Therefore, this research was carried out using a design science research methodology, 
with the aim of helping to fill the knowledge gap in ICS security engineering research 




1.3. Research Hypothesis  
Technology can be used to support developers in the design of secure control systems 
and in improving their security knowledge. The resulting supported framework was 
defined as the Industrial Control Systems Security Engineering Support, ‘ICS-SES’. 
The argument is that ICS-SES can assist engineers in developing secure control 
systems. ICS-SES is usable and can effectively help developers improve their 
security knowledge and design secure control systems. 
1.4. Research Question 
The following research questions have been formulated to support the thesis 
statement:  
1. What is the state-of-the-art in control system security engineering? 
2. What are developers’ needs regarding the design of secure control systems? 
3. Can an on-the-job adaptive tool be created to support control system security by 
design? 
4. Can a supported tool assist developers in designing secure control systems? 
1.5. Research Aim and Objectives 
The aim of this research is to develop a solution to support and improve control 
system security engineering as a response to the shortcomings in the current 
development approaches. 
This aim is supported by the following objectives:  
1. To systematically review the literature concerning ICS security engineering, 
ICS security by design, challenges in developing secure ICS, using security 
patterns in ICS development, and ICS security support and training.  
2. To understand the current level of developers’ security awareness and 
knowledge. 
3. To understand control system developers’ needs in designing secure control 
systems. 





5. To provide an on-the-job technical support mechanism for designing secure 
control systems. 
6. To provide on-the-job adaptive security training tailored to personal developers’ 
needs. 
1.6. Success Criteria 
This section indicates the criteria that will be used to measure the success of this 
research. These criteria are formulated as follows: 
• Guiding control system developers in selecting secure design patterns. 
• Providing security training material in understandable language for control 
engineers.  
• Providing training material related to the problem and design context. 
• Providing training material tailored to users’ personal needs. 
• Running with acceptable system performance. 
• Ease of use of the supported tool.  
• User satisfaction. 
The success criteria were measured by evaluating the proposed method through an 
experimental evaluation study.  
1.7. Contribution of the thesis 
This section outlines the contributions of this thesis as the following: 
• A novel adaptive tool that supports control system security engineering 
throughout the development cycle. 
• A novel on-the-job guide using secure design patterns in control system 
development. 
• The use of on-the-job security training in the discipline of control engineering. 
• A new combination of security pattern guide and embedded training aid. 
• Contextualised and personalised security training for industrial control systems. 
• Bridging the gap between security experts and control system engineers. 




1.8. Thesis Structure 
This section briefly summarises the thesis structure. This thesis is organised into eight 
chapters in line with the research objectives. 
Chapter Two: Systematic Literature Review 
This chapter presents a systematic literature review concerning control system 
security engineering issues and challenges. The chapter provides essential 
background information. It identifies the state-of-the-art in ICS security by design 
and highlights the limitations of previous work on ICS security engineering in the 
literature. 
Chapter Three: Research Methodology  
This chapter discusses information system research paradigm candidates and justifies 
the selection of the Design Science Research (DSR) methodology to conduct this 
research. It introduces our research design in relation to the selected methodology.                   
Chapter Four: A qualitative study of Control System Developers’ Support Needs 
for Security Engineering 
This chapter introduces a qualitative study designed to enrich the understanding of 
ICS security engineering and identify current levels of security awareness and 
knowledge amongst control engineers. It identifies developers’ needs regarding the 
design of secure control systems.      
Chapter Five: Framework  
The chapter introduces the proposed Industrial Control System Security Engineering 
Support (ICS-SES) framework. It demonstrates the proposed pattern-based security 
guide and tailored training method. The chapter explains the workflow required to 
support the ICS security engineering process. 




This chapter presents an empirical study to evaluate the usability of the proposed 
framework. The chapter discusses the experimental design and procedure and 
illustrates its execution.  
Chapter Seven: Analysis and Evaluation 
This chapter analyses and discusses the results. It evaluates the ICS-SES framework 
and discusses the research findings. 
Chapter Eight: Conclusion and Future Work 
This chapter concludes this thesis and discusses the research contributions and 









• To provide essential background information. 
• To identify the body of work related to the research questions 
• To identify the state-of-the-art of ICS security by design 
• To identify the gap in the knowledge and limitations of previous work. 
2.1- Introduction 
Industrial Control Systems are used for monitoring and controlling critical 
infrastructures that provides nations with essential resources such as electricity and 
water. If these systems stop working properly, the consequences could be 
disasterous: significant equipment damage, serious environmental damage or even 
death.  
In the past, Industrial Control Systems, ‘ICS’, were initially built as standalone 
systems and were not connected to the internet, which made security considerations 
unimportant in control systems development (Drias et al., 2015). As these systems 
are now being incorporated into Wide Area Networks (Orlikowski and Baroudi) and 
are thus potentially reachable by malicious internet users, ICSs are becoming 
increasingly at risk from cyber-attack (Durrani et al., 2013).  
This chapter introduces a systematic literature review on the area of ICS security 
research. The review was conducted based on the guidelines identified by Keele 
(Keele, 2007) and Kitchenham et al (Kitchenham et al., 2009). The methodology of 
the review is discussed in Chapter 3, Section 3.4.      
2.2. Background 
An Industrial Control System (ICS), consists of several types of field devices that are 
supervised from a centralised location (Galloway and Hancke, 2013) (Fovino et al., 




infrastructure such as water and wastewater treatment, chemical, oil and natural gas, 
transportation, power stations and discrete manufacturing. ICSs encompass several 
types of control systems, such as distributed control systems (DCS), and Supervisory 
Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems as shown in Figure 2.1. The main 
distinction between these two systems is that SCADA systems are more 





 Figure 2-1 Industrial Control Systems (Stouffer et al., 2011) 
The following subsections explain the components of ICS and address the differences 
between ICS and Information Technology (IT). 
2.2.1- Common Industrial control Systems components 
This section presents ICS Architecture, which includes control components and 
industrial network components.  
Figure 2-2 ICS Architecture (ICS-CERT) 
DCS: single 





ICS components are used to control and monitor field devices, as shown in Figure 
2.2 (ICS-CERT). 
Figure 2-3 ICS Process (ICS-CERT) 
Figure 2.3 shows that ICS architecture consists of three main components: 
Field Devices: are the interface between physical processes and control systems. 
They include input devices such as sensors and measuring instruments that measure 
the device outputs which control process parameters and actuators, as shown in figure 
2-4. 
Figure 2-4 Input and Output Devices in ICS (ICS-CERT) 
Field Controllers: these components control the communication between field 
devices and Human Machine Interface (HMI). They collect input and output data 
from field devices and send it to the HMI that accordingly issues process control 
commands and send these to the field controllers. In large distributed systems, the 
field controllers may collect and process information from hundreds of field 
devices. They are often located close to field devices in order to be able to perform 




Field Controllers are embedded microprocessor devices. They convert electrical 
signal ‘input data’ received from field devices into digital signals and convert the 
digital signals received from HMI into ‘output data’. The four main types of field 
controllers are: Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC), Intelligent Electronic 
Devices (IED), Programmable Automation Controllers (PAC), and Remote Terminal 
Units (RTU). 
Human Machine Interface ‘HMI’: is a user interface that provides a graphical 
visualisation of industrial monitoring and control systems. HMIs allow operators to 
view real-time or near real-time process information. HMIs are typically run from 
computers from such devices as touch panels or software-based applications on 
personal computers, smartphones, tablets, or workstations. HMIs are used by 
operators to control and monitor processes through their communication with field 
controllers such as PLC, PAC and RTU. They are capable of supporting other 
applications and providing historical trends, event notifications and alarms.  
Figure 2-5 Data Flow within an Industrial Control System (ICS-CERT) 
Figure 2.5. articulates an example of the communication between ICS components. 
The field devices send process data to field controllers. Field controllers transmit 
these data and send them to the related component(s). They send real-time process 
data to the HMI, historical process data to the historian and hardware error statuses 




From a security perspective, HMI systems and data are obvious targets for cyber-
attacks, as they are usually connected to outside networks or are accessible via remote 
access methods. This interconnectivity could allow an attacker to take over critical 
system processes (ICS-CERT). 
2.2.2-  Industrial Control Systems and Information Technology. 
Industrial Control Systems adopt IT solutions to increase their capability in terms of 
remote access and corporate connectivity. They are being developed using Operating 
Systems (OS), industry standard computers, and network protocols (Stouffer et al., 
2011). This integration promotes the associated IT capabilities; however, it also 
makes ICSs less isolated from the outside world, increasing the need to secure these 
systems (Stouffer et al., 2011).      
Figure 2.6 shows the most common elements in IT architecture. It helps to identify 
the similarities between IT and ICS architectures as this is paramount to addressing 
cybersecurity strategies within control systems. The diagram articulates how system 
components communicate within both the business world and control systems (ICS-
CERT). 
  Figure 2-6 IT architecture and control system architecture (ICS-CERT). 
Despite a number of similarities between these two systems, Industrial Control 
Systems similar differ from standard IT systems in many ways, such as priorities and 




sometimes conflict with security standards in control system design and operation, 
e.g., they require authorisation and authentication that should not interfere with or 
hamper emergency actions. The following table summarises some of these 
differences and considerations when securing ICS systems (ICS-CERT). 
Category 
 
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Information Technology Systems (IT) 
Availability 
Requirements 
Responses that affect system availability 
(e.g. rebooting) may not acceptable.  
Availability requirements may require 
redundant systems.  
Outages must be scheduled and planned 
in advance. 
Exhaustive pre-deployment testing is 
required for high availability. 
Accept responses such as rebooting.  
Some system requirements can tolerate 




The main focus is to protect edge clients 
such as field devices and process 
controllers. 
It is also important to protect the central 
server. 
The main target is to protect IT assets, 
including stored and transmitted 
information. 




Emergency interaction and response to 
human is critical. 
ICS should have strict access control, but 
this should not hamper HMI. 
Emergency interaction in IT systems is 
less critical. 
Access control implementation can be 






Modest throughput is acceptable. High 
delay is not acceptable. 
Non-real-time  
Consistent response. 
IT systems require high throughput. 
High delay may be acceptable. 
Risk Management 
Requirements 
The primary requirement is human 
safety, followed by process protection. 
Fault tolerance is mandatory because 
even momentary downtime may not be 
acceptable.  
The main risk factors are equipment, 
production, environmental damage or 
loss of life. 
Data confidentiality and integrity is 
paramount. 
Fault tolerance requirements are less 
important in IT because quick 
downtime is not a major risk. 




Software changes must not affect control 
system integrity. They must be 
thoroughly tested before being deployed. 
ICS outages must be scheduled and 
planned in advance. 
Control systems may use unsupported 
Operating Systems. 
Software changes are applied promptly 
using well-designed procedures and 
security policies. 
Automated procedures are often used 
in these systems. 
System Operation Operating systems are possibly owned, 
systems are often designed without 
security capabilities. 
Software vendors must make software 
changes carefully due to the specific 
control algorithms, the possible 
modifications involved in both the 
software and hardware. 
Systems are built for utility with typical 
operating systems  
System upgrades are straightforward 
using automated deployment tools. 






2.2.3-  Industrial Control Systems Security 
Control systems differ from standard IT systems in terms of security goals. Security 
goals are generally defined as being in one of three categories: Confidentiality, 
Integrity and Availability (Drias et al., 2015). The security focus of standard IT 
systems is to protect systems from unauthorized access and to maintain their 
confidentiality, while ICS developers usually place considerable emphasis on 
ensuring that systems operate in a safe manner and maintain their functionalities 
(Availability and Integrity) (Stouffer et al., 2011).  
2.2.4-  Control System Vulnerabilities 
A vulnerability is defined as a root cause of risk that makes an asset unable to resist 
actions and threats (Grobauer et al., 2011). A vulnerability can be described as a 
security-related weakness or a flaw in a system design,  implementation or 
configuration that can be viciously exploited so as to harm system security (Grobauer 
et al., 2011) (Kuang et al., 2006) (Ozment, 2007). These security flaws can be 
introduced at any phase of control system development lifecycle due to the 
complexity of application environments and development (Kuang et al., 2006). 
Security vulnerabilities could have different structures, times at which they are 
introduced and extent of associated risk, but they should all be minimised and 
controlled to reduce any risks that might arise from possible threats. The following 
gives the conventional meanings of vulnerability, threat and risk (ISO/IEC.27002, 
2005). 
• Vulnerability: is a weakness of any asset in the system that can be exploited by 
threats. 
• Threat: is a potential for a vulnerability to become an attack, causing serious 
harm to the system.  
• Risk: is a combination of the probability of the incidence of an attack 
(vulnerability x threat) and its resulting impact.  
There are common ICS vulnerabilities that are published and classified by different 
categories. In 2007, the North American Electric Reliability Council ‘NERC’ 




1. Insufficient knowledge, procedures and policies that govern the security of 
control systems. 
2. Control system networks are not adequately designed, lacking defence-in-depth 
mechanisms.  
3. Control systems are remotely accessible without appropriate access control. 
4. Inadequately maintained system administration mechanisms and software used 
in ICS. 
5. Use of vulnerable wireless communications for control. 
6. Use of control system network bandwidth for non-control purposes, using non-
dedicated control communications channels for control commands. 
7. Inadequate application of tools to discover and report inappropriate activities. 
8. Unauthorised devices or applications on control system networks. 
9. Unauthenticated control data and commands. 
10. Inadequately designed or implemented critical infrastructure.  
In 2010, the National SCADA Test Bed (NSTB) identified common vulnerabilities 
that allow attackers to penetrate ICSs and gain full control of system elements 
(NSTB, 2016). NSTB published the top ten most critical ICS vulnerabilities based 
on the likelihood and impact of compromise as follows: 
1- Unpatched published vulnerabilities. 
2- Using vulnerable remote protocols.  
3- Web HMI vulnerabilities.  
4- Buffer overflow vulnerabilities in ICS services.  
5- Improper authentication.  
6- Improper access control (authorization).  
7- Using cleartext authentication with standard IT protocols.  
8- Unsecured transport of ICS application credentials.  
9- Injection and manipulation of control commands and data.  
10- SQL injection. 
2.2.5-  Control System Attacks 
Historically, control systems were isolated and operated without any physical 
connection to public networks (Alcaraz et al., 2012). However, these systems have, 




and data provided by the internet for business purposes (ICS-CERT). This 
connectivity improves the quality of the services rendered to both customers and 
operators such as through real-time monitoring, concurrency, peer-to-peer 
communications, maintenance and redundancy (Alcaraz et al., 2012). As a result, 
control systems are now susceptible to various kinds of threats (Larkin et al., 2014). 
Fovino et al. categorised attacks into two main classes (Fovino et al., 2010). The first 
class involves traditional IT attacks that target IT system vulnerabilities. The second 
class includes ICS-specific attacks that target ICS elements. Fleury et al. discussed 
the following targets for ICS attacks (Fleury et al., 2008): 
▪ System: ICS elements that process critical decisions and calculations.  
▪ User: non-permitted use of user accounts. 
▪ Network: exploitation of communications through IP protocols.  
▪ Process: impacts on control system functions.  
▪ Data: data modification or stealing through unauthorised access. 
Fernandez et al. categorised attacks according to ICS components as follows 
(Fernandez et al., 2011): 
▪ Attacks through/against field devices such as malicious alteration of runtime 
parameters, physical attacks, wrong commands to the field devices and denial of 
service.  
▪ Attacks through/against field controllers such as malicious of the runtime 
parameters, wrong commands to the field devices, physical attacks and denial of 
service. 
▪ Attacks through/against the communication networks such as spoofing, sniffing 
and denial of service. 
From a control engineer point of view, Zhu et al. grouped ICS attacks into the 
following categories (Zhu et al., 2011): 
▪ Invalid input data to controller devices by exploiting network links. 
▪ Inaccurate and misleading output data from controller devices due to exploiting 
control networks. 
▪ Denial of service – delay or missing task actions. 




Control systems can be attacked locally via physical access or remotely through 
unsecured networks. Local access attacks can be gained via different means of entry, 
as described by Byres et al. (Byres et al., 2006) and Anwar et al. (Anwar and Malik, 2014):   
▪ Data files such as PLC project files. 
▪ Historian and Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) servers shared with business 
users.  
▪ Serial connections. 
▪ Devices such as USB drives and laptops. 
▪ Wireless devices. 
▪ Remote access modems. 
Control system attacks could have serious effects on nations and environments. The 
Stuxnet worm, for instance, caused critical problems at the Natanz fuel enrichment 
plant in Iran (Langner, 2011). In Australia, ICS attacks caused the Maroochy Shire 
sewage to be spilled (Abrams and Weiss, 2008). The David-Besse nuclear power plant 
in Ohio was disabled by the Slammer worm attack (Poulsen, 2003). Duqu (Chien et al., 
2012) and Night Dragon (Cyberattacks, 2011) collect information about ICS in order 
to implement future attacks.  
2.2.6-  Security Training and Education in Industrial Control Systems  
Learning can typically be defined as a continuum process, starting with awareness, 
building to training and developing, and finally to education (Wilson and Hash, 
2003). Figure 2.7 illustrates learning levels in the context of security. The National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) defines security awareness, training 
and education as follows (Toth and Klein, 2013): 
Security awareness: is intended to establish recognition of security issues that allow 
individuals to recognise security concerns in order to reinforce good security 






Figure 2-7 The IT Security Learning Continuum (source: reference (Wilson and Hash, 2003)) 
Security training: is the more formal learning method, which aims to build needed 
security skills and knowledge. The major difference between awareness and training 
is that awareness focuses users’ attention on an issue, while training aims to teach 






Security education: is defined by NIST 800-16 as follows: 
“The ‘Education’ level integrates all of the security skills and competencies of the 
various functional specialties into a common body of knowledge, adds a 
multidisciplinary study of concepts, issues, and principles (technological and 
social), and strives to produce IT security specialists and professionals capable of 
vision and pro-active response” (Toth and Klein, 2013) 
2.2.7-  Security patterns 
In 1994, E. Gamma, R. Helm, R. Johnson, and J. Vlissides, known as th Gang of 
Four (GOF) among the pattern community, paved the way for design patterns 
(Gamma, 1995). The main intention of design patterns is to facilitate software 
development processes by reusing good practice in the design and implementation 
phase (da Silva Júnior et al., 2013). In the context of security, the first security pattern 
contribution was published by Yoder and Barcalow, who structured patterns using a 
GOF template (Yoder and Barcalow, 1998). Security patterns are defined by Markus 
Schumacher et al.  as follows: 
“A security pattern describes a particular recurring security problem that 
arises in specific contexts, and presents a well-proven generic solution for it. 
The solution consists of a set of interacting roles that can be arranged into 
multiple concrete design structures, as well as a process to create one 
particular such structure.” (Schumacher et al., 2013) 
Patterns are typically designed to represent a well-defined solution for a particular 
frequently encountered problem (Schumacher et al., 2013). They help developers to 
solve difficult problems by using approved solutions; however, they have only a 
small impact on system architecture due to certain limitations. Since 2000, the 
Pattern-Oriented Software Architecture ‘POSA’ team overcame these limitations and 
patterns have been used in a number of areas, such as resource management, human-





2.3. Review aims and research questions 
The intention behind performing a systematic literature review on industrial control 
system security is to answer the following research questions: 
1- What is the state-of-the-art in ICS security by design?  
2- What are the challenges of developing secure ICS? 
3- What is the current level of security knowledge of control engineers?  
4- What is the state-of-the-art in security patterns in ICS?  
5- What support and training are related to the design of secure ICS have been 
proposed?  
2.4. Search and selection process 
The literature search was performed through the university library system by 
searching resources that include databases, journals, conference proceedings and 
eBooks, as shown in Table 2.2. An advanced search was performed across both the 
disciplines of both information technology and engineering. Also, the SCADAhacker 
website (SCADAHACKER, 2016) was searched for related industry articles and 
contributions such as technical reports and white papers. Each resource was reviewed 
and the papers that addressed ICS security of any type were identified as being 
potentially relevant. Each publication was classified as either relevant or otherwise 
by applying certain inclusion and exclusion criteria, as discussed in the next section. 
Search keywords were extracted from each research question. Synonyms, 
abbreviations and alternative terms were listed with due consideration for subject 
headlines used in data sources. Keywords were used singularly and in combination 
to collect data, including: “developing secure industrial control system”, “developing 
secure SCADA”, “industrial control system security by design”, “industrial control 
system security challenges”, “SCADA security challenges”, “control engineers’ 
security knowledge”, “industrial control system security design patterns”, “industrial 







Table 2-2 Selected sources 
2.5. Inclusion and Exclusion criteria 
Inclusion and exclusion criteria were defined based on the research questions given 
in Section 2.3. 
2.5.1- Inclusion criteria 
In order to identify the body of relevant research, sources were measured over two 
stages (selection-stage-1 and selection-stage-2) against a number of criteria that were 
defined based on the research questions identified in section 2.3, with respect to the 
use of different terms associated with industrial control systems (such as ICS, and 
SCADA, and Automated control systems). Each article must be written in English 
and meet at least one of the following criteria to be selected:  
1- The work relates to industrial control system security development cycles. 
2- The work relates to ICS/SCADA security by design. 
3- The research investigates the challenges of securing ICS/SCADA. 
4- The research relates to study of the role of system engineers in ICS/SCADA 
security development. 
Data Source Documentation/publisher 
Journals  • IEEE Xplore 
• ACM Digital Library 
• Springer 
Conference Proceedings • IEEE Xplore 
• ACM Digital Library 
• Springer/Lecture Notes in Computer Science 
(LNCS) 
• Google Scholar 
e-Books • IEEE-Wiley eBooks Library 
• Safari Books Online 
• Springer eBooks 
• Library search 











5- The work investigates the level of security awareness and skills of ICS/SCADA 
developers.  
6- The research describes a systematic method for ICS/SCADA security design, 
such as secure architecture, guidelines, security patterns, and standards. 
7- The research proposes training support for the ICS/SCADA workforce. 
2.5.2- Exclusion criteria 
Any article on the following topics was classified as irrelevant and excluded: 
- Papers reporting incident responses. 
- Research relating to the study of risk assessment. 
- Organisation specific articles. 
- Vulnerability analysis. 
- Papers proposing safety guidelines. 
- Work relating to safety by design. 
- Work investigating the relationship between ICS security and safety. 
Initially, at selection-stage-1, the selection criteria were applied based on the title 
and abstract. At this stage, full copies were obtained unless publications were clearly 
excluded. 
Then, final inclusions and exclusions were made after the content was reviewed at 
selection-stage-2.  
2.6. Results   
This section shows the results of the search process covering the period from 2008 
to November 2016. A search process revealed 379 articles that cover various topics 
of ICS security, including ICS security requirement engineering, IoT security 
challenges, ICS security by design, formal verification, vulnerability assessment, 
threat analysis, incident response, ICS security strategy and governance, and security 
training. At selection-stage-1, after screening titles and abstracts, 97 articles were felt 
to be related to the research questions and appropriate for potential inclusion in a 




 These articles were then subjected to further screening by obtaining their full texts 











Table 2-3 Search results 
 
 Table 2-4 Shows the related publications by year (2008-November 2016) 
The remaining 65 unique articles identified as appropriate were read thoroughly, as 
presented in Table 2.3 and Table 2.4. The results of the included articles were collated 
and summarised (see Table-A1 in Appendix-A) in order to answer the research 
questions. 
2.7. Discussion 
The collected data was summarised and classified based on the research questions.  
Q1. What is the state-of-the-art in ICS security by design? 
In the past, ICSs were developed to meet availability, performance, flexibility, and 
functional safety requirements that were considered good design goals; in most cases, 
Data Source 
No. of articles selected in 
Selection-stage-1 
No. of articles selected in 
Selection-stage-2 
ACM 16 9 
Science Direct (Elsevier) 8 5 
IEEE 40 33 
Springer 4 1 
Grey Literature 25 15 
e-books (chapter) 4 2 
Total 97  65 
Year of publication 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 up to November 




this was done without consideration for security issues as in most cases ICSs were 
isolated from outside networks (Drias et al., 2015) (Shukla, 2016) (Luiijf, 2015). Up 
to 2008, most of the research effort for protecting ICSs has emphasised reliability 
(Hadziosmanovic et al., 2012). However, since ICSs have begun to be used to control 
and monitor critical infrastructures and have been connected over the internet world 
by adopting IT technologies, security has become a genuine concern for both ICS 
vendors and owners (Drias et al., 2015) (Durrani et al., 2013) (Fernandez et al., 2011). 
The literature shows that developing secure ICS has been the focus of many 
researchers (Drias et al., 2015) (Axelrod, 2011) (Kunsman et al., 2015). Researchers 
around the world have considered various aspects of ICS security; the strongest focus 
can be found in North America, followed by Europe, whilst the Middle East, South 
America, and Asia are constantly increasing their focus (Hadziosmanovic et al., 
2012). Both industrial and government-led research has expended considerable effort 
in order to enhance the security of ICS over several sectors, e.g., chemical, water, oil 
and gas. 
Hadziosmanovic et al. highlighted two reasons for increasing attention on ICS 
security amongst the research community: first, the importance of ICSs, as they 
control and monitor critical infrastructure; secondly, the number of ICS security 
incidents has significantly increased in recent years (Abouzakhar, 2013) 
(Hadziosmanovic et al., 2012).  
Traditionally, ICS developers have focused on safety (Kargl et al., 2014). Pedroza et 
al. distinguished between safety and security engineering as a system that maintains 
a high level of safety can handle new security threat (Pedroza et al., 2011). They 
modelled security properties by extending SYSML. Hadziosmanovic et al. and 
Krotofil et al. stated that ICSs are, generally speaking, not sufficiently secured and 
need more directed research effort (Hadziosmanovic et al., 2012) (Krotofil and 
Gollmann, 2013). The main problem being addressed is in terms of the gap between 
ICS vendors and information security professionals, vendors mainly focus on the 
functionality of ICS and lack security knowledge, while security professionals lack 
experience in ICS in general (Kunsman et al., 2015) (Yang and Zhao, 2014)  (Brändle 




that the two types of firms must bridge this clear gap and work together to implement 
feasible solutions. 
In this context, other researchers recommended that the problem can be solved by 
systemically integrating security mechanisms across the entire development lifecycle 
(Fernandez et al., 2011) (Zineddine, 2016) (Oates, 2005). They proposed using 
security design patterns as a tool to build secure SCADA systems that need to be 
protected against attacks. Their methodology can be utilised as a guideline for 
applying the security patterns through all phases of system development. Ur-Rehman 
and Zivic also introduced a security  by design approach (Ur-Rehman and Zivic, 
2015). Novak and Treytl illustrated the importance of applying security at various 
developmental stages and proposed considering security together with safety at the 
system design phase (Novak and Treytl, 2008). Cheminod et al. stated that security 
by design is the first line of defense in preventing the exploitation of vulnerabilities 
(Cheminod et al., 2013). Many security issues are recurring problems and can be 
solved by making security part of the design (Ur-Rehman and Zivic, 2015). A good 
security architecture will facilitate security implementation within future protected 
ICSs (He et al., 2016). Otherwise, security flaws might be introduced at different 
phases of the development cycle (Motii et al., 2015). 
In summary, the literature shows that the research effort has significantly increased 
in the sphere of ICS security and as the focus of security by design. However, they 
stated that current efforts in this regard are still not sufficient and more effort is 
needed, especially in the area of ICS security by design.  
Many researchers have addressed the fact that ICS lacks security and requires more 
attention from researchers. The literature demonstrated that including security 
throughout the entirety of the development lifecycle is paramount to building secure 
ICS that is resistant to attacks. However, the review also shows that current research 
focuses on ‘treating’ more than ‘preventing’, and has not achieved effective results 
in developing secure systems. 
Q2. What are the challenges of developing secure ICS? 
Protecting control systems against internal and external security threats is one of the 




comprehensive analysis of ICS architectures, focussing in particular on security 
issues including vulnerability, threat, and security solutions (Drias et al., 2015). Their 
findings showed that one of the main ICS security challenges is that of developing 
secure ICS, which can be overcome by tailored security solutions. Kurscheid 
identified two main challenges: first, applying security is not trivial, requiring greater 
effort that makes the system more complex; secondly, the true level of system 
security is hard to demonstrate (Kurscheid, 2013). 
The fourth industrial revolution (Industrie 4.0), which is also known as “Smart 
Factory”, has brought further challenges for control system security (He et al., 2016). 
Sajid et al. discussed the security challenges that have, in the main, been inherited 
from its integration with the Internet of Things (IoT) (Sajid et al., 2016). They 
focused on developing systems that are simultaneously ‘smart’ and ‘secure’, and 
proposed a security architecture for industrial IoT as a solution. Sadeghi et al. also 
discussed security challenges related to industrial IoT and proposed solution of 
secure engineering to counter associated security risks (Sadeghi et al., 2015). 
On the other hand, many researchers have highlighted the challenge of understanding 
ICS security (Kunsman et al., 2015) (Annex, 2011)  (Luiijf, 2015). ENISA identified 
‘creating a security culture’ as a key challenge for securing control systems (Annex, 
2011). Amaechi and Counsell highlighted the lack of clarity and understanding of 
security as being a key challenge to system design (Amaechi and Counsell, 2012). 
Annex also indicated the challenge of insecure ICS by design and the lack of proper 
governance of ICS; they proposed a number of recommendations to improve such 
governance by raising awareness of security (Annex, 2011).   
In summary, the literature addressed the various challenges associated with securing 
control systems based on different aspects. However, the challenges in our sphere of 
interest fall into two categories: 
- ICS security by design  
- ICS security education and awareness   
The literature also shows that other challenges of securing ICS such as lacking 
tailored methods that take the nature of ICS into account, following by the the affect 







Q3. What is the current level of security knowledge of control engineers? 
ICS Security awareness and education has become a real concern (Durrani et al., 
2013) (Amaechi and Counsell, 2012, Boyes, 2015)  (Miyachi and Yamada, 2014)    
(Vaughn Jr and Morris, 2016). Amaechi et al. and Savola et al. indicated the lack of 
security awareness and skills in the ICS domain and recommended using security 
guidelines to develop secure systems (Amaechi and Counsell, 2012) (Savola and 
Ahonen, 2006). Pauna indicated that the current security challenges imply the need 
for ICS professionals with good security knowledge (Pauna et al., 2014). Security-
unaware developers and employees were identified by Durrani et al. as being the 
weakest link in terms of system security (Durrani et al., 2013). The lack of security 
awareness and training was outlined as being amongst a set of ten security concerns 
associated with ICS (Vaughn Jr and Morris, 2016). The review by Graham et al. 
identified six main factors that are root causes of ICS security vulnerabilities, one of 
which is the lack of security training (Graham et al., 2016). Axelrod outlined the 
knowledge gap between ICS professionals and information security professionals, 
and indicated the need to increase security training and education (Axelrod, 2011). 
Ismail et al. conducted interviews with ICS professionals from different countries to 
measure their levels of security awareness (Ismail et al., 2014); their findings showed 
that organisations, generally speaking, lack security awareness and training.     
ENISA highlighted the importance of security education and awareness in creating a 
security culture that can overcome the challenge of developing secure ICSs (Annex, 
2011). A security awareness program is paramount for mitigation and appropriate 
defence plans (Durrani et al., 2013). Amaechi and Counsell investigated design 
success factors using ICS as a case study (Amaechi and Counsell, 2012). They found 
that raising security awareness using design methods and learning materials can 
overcome the risk associated with lack of knowledge. Similarly, Miyachi and 
Yamada  stated that the ICS community, including developers, operators, owners and 
users, should have a level security knowledge as appropriate to their responsibilities 




needed to create a security culture that can mitigate ICS vulnerabilities (Navarro et 
al., 2014) (Annex, 2011).  
Pauna indicated the challenge of developing the proper security education relating to 
operational issues, as ICS and information security are very different topics (Pauna 
et al., 2014). There are many educational programs in research laboratories. 
Mississippi State University has a strong focus on ICS security, and there is a security 
course introduced by Luallen and Labruyere for control system developers (Luallen 
and Labruyere, 2013). Other organisations have put considerable effort into security 
training and education such as CPNI, NSTB, SANS,  NERC and ICS-CERT (ICS-
CERT) (NERC) (NSTB, 2016) (CPNI, 2016) (SANS, 2016) (Francia III, 2011).  
In summary, security education is typically offered by colleges and universities that 
provide a degree when obtaining the associated learning program. The literature 
clearly indicates that security awareness and training plays a major role in improving 
ICS security (Wilson and Hash, 2003) (Stouffer et al., 2011). Control engineers 
should receive security training that focusses on their responsibilities in order to 
understand organisational policies, security weaknesses, recommended security 
patterns and how to properly protect ICS resources (Stouffer et al., 2011)  (Permann 
et al., 2006). Unfortunately, the previous literature also indicates that ICS developers 
lack security awareness and knowledge, and there is a culture gap between 
developers and the security experts responsible for providing security solutions to 
protect these systems from attack (Stouffer et al., 2011). 
Q4. What is the state-of-the-art in using security patterns in ICS? 
Security patterns are a feasible tool for reducing design flaws in a system (Ur-
Rehman and Zivic, 2015). Using security patterns in control systems was first 
proposed in reference (Fernandez et al., 2011). The authors of this article provided a 
mechanism to apply security patterns throughout the whole development lifecycle. 
Motii et al. demonstrated a guideline for selecting security patterns using a control 
system case study (Motii et al., 2015). Ur-Rehman and Zivic proposed a security by 
design approach using security patterns (Ur-Rehman and Zivic, 2015). SANS also 




In summary, using security design patterns helps in the reuse of expert knowledge 
and the mitigation of vulnerabilities introduced during system design (Ur-Rehman 
and Zivic, 2015). However, the literature clearly illustrates that very little research 
effort has been expended on using pattern-based design approaches within the ICS 
domain (Fernandez et al., 2011) (Motii et al., 2015) (Obregon, 2015).  
Q5. What support and training related to the design of secure ICS has been 
proposed? 
ICS developers lack methods and tools that support ICS security engineering (ICS-
CERT) (Brändle and Naedele, 2008) (CPNI, 2016). Brundle and Naedele 
recommended supporting ICS developers by providing security training with a level 
of abstraction without complex security details (Brändle and Naedele, 2008). 
Security guidelines can help ICS developers to apply security throughout the 
development lifecycle (Motii et al., 2015). Homeland Security recommended that 
vendors should educate developers in secure coding and best practice in order to 
detect vulnerabilities during the system development lifecycle, and, of course, before 
system release (Nelso and Chaffin, 2011). While they focused on secure coding, 
supporting programmers and securing implementation provide a sound approach for 
other developmental phases.  
Both the research community and government organisations have published 
numerous articles on common ICS vulnerabilities and proposed security measures 
and solutions and training programs for control systems (McGrew and Vaughn, 
2009)  (Stouffer et al., 2011) (ICS-CERT). For example, the Department of Homeland 
Security delivers critical infrastructure cyber-security training from Idaho National 
Laboratories (INL) in the US. The Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency 
Response Team (ICS-CERT) also offers a number of courses with up to seven days 
security training (ICS-CERT training). The National SCADA Test Bed (NSTB) 
(NSTB, 2016) delivers three levels of SCADA security courses namely the 
introductory, intermediate and advanced (NSTB, 2016). While these training 
programs are valuable, they are offered for a limited amount of time and number of 
attendees.  
In addition, there are a number of tools that have been developed to support ICS 




certain standards using a question and answer method (ICS-CERT). Pedroza et al.  
proposed a tool that extends a popular modeling language (SYSML) to support 
system designers in modeling security properties (Pedroza et al., 2011). However, 
they did not focus on security awareness and education. 
The Cyber Security Modelling Language (CySeMoL), which has been created by 
the KTH in Stockholm, estimates the probability of success of attack. CySeMoL 
does not provide information about existing weakness or possible solutions, 
however, and additionally (though perhaps understandably) only the tool creators 
can update it.  
ValueSec, which has rebuilt Lancelot, is a risk management platform (Prez and 
Machnicki, 2013). It is used to analyse security risks within the SCADA 
environment. While this tool performs security analysis and suggests mitigation 
plans, it does not focus on the security learning aspect. 
Francia at al. reviewed ICS security best practices and risk assessment; their research 
findings indicated that most of the currently available tools do not focus on the 
learning aspect. Tools mainly provide security awareness without training and 
education (Foo et al., 2013).  
In summary, the literature clearly shows that ICS developers lack security support in 
terms of both technical (within the system development environment) and knowledge 
support through training programs. The literature also indicated the importance of 
the learning aspect of any proposed method.  
This systematic review revealed a number of key references that identified the 
academic and industrial motivation behind this research: 
• Developing secure control systems has become important as they control and 
monitor critical infrastructure, in addition to the significant increase in the 
number of ICS security incidents over the last decade (Hadziosmanovic et al., 
2012). Therefore, there is a need for greater research effort focussing on ICS 
security.  
 
• Understanding ICS security was identified as a key challenge in system design 




plays an important role in improving ICS security (Stouffer et al., 2011). 
However, there is a culture gap between ICS vendors and information security 
professionals, as vendors mainly focus on the functionality of ICS and lack 
security knowledge, while security professionals lack experience in ICS 
(Axelrod, 2011) (Yang and Zhao, 2014).There is a need to increase security 
training and education to bridge this gap and support developers in working 
together with security professionals to develop feasible solutions. 
  
• The Security for Industrial Control System (SICS) Framework, provided by 
CPNI, presents good practice principles for ICS security (ICS-CERT) (CPNI, 
2016). The framework identifies security awareness and skills as one core 
elements in ensuring ICSs are secure by design. Therefore, it is imperative to 
develop a powerful training method to inform improvements of ICS developers’ 
security knowledge. 
  
• Well-structured solutions such as security patterns can be used as a basis for 
developing security guidance and good design practice within the system 
development cycle (Fernandez et al., 2011). These patterns capture security 
expertise by identifying both a security problem and its solution. The pattern-
based approach is believed to have the potential to solve the problem addressed 
in this research and can be adopted to effectively enhance security knowledge of 
system developers. 
  
• Security patterns provide a possible description as to how to solve problems in 
the form of worked solutions. However, security patterns have been criticised as 
they do not provide a practical guide as to how to they can be selected or applied 
(Ur-Rehman and Zivic, 2015). Therefore, there is the need for a method that can 
guide system developers in their selection and reuse of these patterns.  
2.8. Conclusion 
This chapter presented a systematic literature review of ICS security by finding 
answers from the research literature to five research questions. Most of the articles 
studied identified the limitations of the current research, the lack of security 




all development phases. However, little attention was given to pattern-based 
approaches and developing methods that can support ICS developers within the 
system development cycle.  
Based on the above discussion, there is a clear need for a systematic method of 
considering security requirements early in ICS development phases. It was also found 
that there is a need to pay more attention to the role of system developers in building 
secure ICSs, and in improving their security knowledge. This gap identifies the 
roadmap for our research. In particular, pattern-based approaches, ICS security by 
design, and tailored training approaches, will be adopted to support developers in 
building secure control systems. 
The next chapter discusses the selected research methodology, emphasising the 
research paradigm, mapping this research into the selected methodology, and data 









• To discuss information system research paradigm candidates 
• To justify the selection of the Design Science Research (DSR) methodology  
• To discuss the phases of the Design Science Research methodology. 
• To introduce our research design in line with the selected methodology 
 
3.1. Introduction  
This chapter presents the research methodology used to carry out this research. The 
chapter explains and justifies the selection of a fitting research approach, employing, 
and adhering to the guideline of the chosen research methodology. 
It was necessary to ensure that our research followed a clearly defined path through 
research approaches and methodologies, as explained by Kumar:   
“Research methods means all those methods and techniques that are used for 
conducting research, and thus refers to the methods the researcher uses in performing 
research operations”(Kumar and Phrommathed, 2005). 
“Research methodology is a way to systematically solve the researcher’s problems; it 
may be understood as the science of studying how research is done scientifically” 
(Kumar and Phrommathed, 2005). 
“The research approach is that the researcher should himself pose a question and 
procedures for throwing light on the questions concerned for formulating or defining 
the research problem” (Kumar and Phrommathed, 2005). 
Therefore, according to these definitions, it was important to distinguish between 
research paradigms and methodologies in order to select an appropriate method to 
design this research. 
This chapter is divided into the following sections. Section 3.2 discusses information 
system research paradigms and explains the appropriate paradigm for our research. 




Section 3.3. Section 3.4 introduces our research design and demonstrates how it was 
mapped into the work packages of the selected methodology. 
3.2. Selecting a Fitting Research Methodology 
The nature of information system research is complex as it gains its contributions 
from multidisciplinary research fields such as mathematics, engineering, behavioral 
science and natural science (Galliers, 1992). There are a variety of research 
approaches, paradigms, methods, and techniques that can be used in different 
research contexts (Al-Debei and Fitzgerald, 2009). Thus, selecting an appropriate 
research method is a key task during the research design process.  
A paradigm is defined as a set of philosophical perspectives, assumptions, and 
guidelines that guide the activities researchers carry out during the research process 
(Mingers, 2001) (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011). 
The paradigms of information system research have certain key characteristics that 
can be classified into three fundamental categories (Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1991):  
Firstly, it has an ontological character, based on the empirical world whether it is 
‘objectively’ independent of human observers, or ‘subjectively’ considers human 
actions and beliefs. The second character is epistemological, raising many questions 
including what can be known? how can knowledge be created and evaluated? or what 
is the relationship between the knower and the knowledge? The final character is that 
of methodology, which represents the relationship between theory and practice.  It 
identifies the strategic approach as to how researchers can carry out their research 
and gain knowledge, rather than use particular techniques and data analysis. 
Across these characteristics, there are different views of what research actually is, 
and how it relates to the developed knowledge. Research paradigms guide 
researchers in making decisions and carrying out research. The awareness of the 
whole range of research approaches, paradigms and strategies are beneficial as such 
understanding normally supports an informed selection (Orlikowski and Baroudi, 
1991). Therefore, the next subsections will discuss the research paradigms in 
information systems to guide the selection of the research methodology towards that 
most appropriate for carrying out this research. The main four paradigms in 




science (Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1991) (Chua, 1986) (Klein and Myers, 1999) (Von 
Alan et al., 2004). 
3.2.1. Positivist Paradigm 
Positivism was defined by Cooclian as a “scientific method”. This paradigm was 
claimed by the French philosopher, Auguste Comte (1798‐1857), who employed it 
in social science research, and demonstrated that observation and reason could be 
used to understand human behaviour (Coolican, 2014).  The research can be 
categorised as positivist if it gives evidence of containing a hypotheses, measures 
research variables either operationally or quantifiably, tests the formulated 
propositions and provides conclusions about a phenomenon based on a sample of the 
research population (Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1991). The reality is objectively given 
and discovered using measurable factors that are independent of researchers and 
participants (Oates, 2005) (Myers, 1997). The positivist paradigm adopts the methods 
of natural science as an approach to producing knowledge about human society 
(Cohen et al., 2013). One of the key criticisms of positivist research that it ignores its 
social environment, and as a result neglects important meanings (Collis and Hussey, 
2013). 
A positivist paradigm may not be appropriate to this research because it aims to 
predict and clarify external reality (Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1991), while our 
research aims to construct a reality. In addition, a positivist paradigm employs 
observation, and quantitative, or statistical, methods to achieve research aims 
(Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1991). By contrast, these methods do not support the main 
aim of this research, which is that of developing an effective supportive method that 
can assist developers in designing control systems.  
3.2.2. Interpretive Paradigm 
Research can be classified as interpretive if it aims to understand the information 
system context and the process whereby it effects, and is effected by, the context 
(Cohen et al., 2013). Interpretive research assumes that the knowledge of reality is 
formed by its social context and obtained through social constructions such as 




individuals and their subjective meanings through interaction with the social 
environment. In other words, interpretive research aims to understand beliefs and 
interpretations in a context appropriate to the generation of meanings, and describing 
and explaining phenomena through participation and qualitative methodology.  
The interpretive paradigm has been subject to criticism by a number of researchers 
(Cohen et al., 2013) (Bernstein, 2011, Fay, 1987, Gibbons, 1987). They addressed 
different drawbacks associated with interpretive research, such as missing external 
circumstances and being ignorant of historic changes.   
Our research may not be an interpretive research due to the following distinguished 
characteristics: (1) Research aim: this research aims to change the state of the 
security knowledge situation by improving security awareness and skills within the 
control engineers’ community, unlike the interpretive research, which aims to 
understand, describe, explain, and interpret a phenomenon. (2) Epistemological 
character: in this research, knowledge is developed through the construction of a 
new supported training method. By contrast, the knowledge developed by 
interpretive research emerges from participants’ interactions.  
Despite the above differences between this research and interpretive research, this 
research does employ one of methods of interpretive research, namely that of the 
qualitative method, to support research problem identification, as explained later in 
section 3.4.1.2. 
3.2.3. Critical Paradigm 
Critical research constructs reality based on a historical perspective by social, 
economic, political, and cultural forces that have been created or shaped over time 
by individuals (Myers, 1997). Critical research aims to enhance the opportunity to 
realise human potential by helping to reduce the causes of unwarranted domination 
through a social critique (Avison et al., 2008). The critical paradigm and interpretive 
paradigm share a number of research characteristics, they support each other, and 
employ methods that are compatible with both kinds of research (Khazanchi and 




This research may not be critical because security knowledge is not created by the 
facts of historical practice. Our research develops knowledge through building an 
adaptable security supported tool. The second key criticism is that critical research 
employs investigative methods to measure beliefs and assumptions. These methods 
cannot support the main aim of this constructive research, which is that of developing 
a supported method and measuring its artefactual impact on control system 
developers.  
3.2.4. Design Science Paradigm 
The design science paradigm was first defined by Walls et al. (Walls et al., 1992) 
Later, in 2004, Hevner et al. refined the definition of this paradigm and presented an 
approach based on seven guidelines (Von Alan et al., 2004). The paradigm started to 
emerge and be used in information system research to enhance the relevance of the 
information system discipline (Purao, 2002, Vaishnavi and Kuechler, 2004). Design 
science research aims to develop novel artefacts in order to improve social or 
organisational systems (Von Alan et al., 2004). 
The design science paradigm is appropriate to our research because of the similarities 
in its research characteristics, as follows: (1) Research aims: design science research 
aims to construct a reality by changing the state of the world situation. Similarly, this 
research aims to change the situation of control system security by improving 
developers’ security awareness and skills through supported methods. (2) 
Epistemology:  in design science research, knowledge is created through making. 
Likewise, this research contributes to knowledge by developing an adaptive security 
supported method that contributes by assisting control system security by design. (3) 
Methodology: the methodological models of design science research paradigms are 
compatible with the aim of this research as they are developmental and capable of 
measuring the constructed artefact. In addition, this paradigm may advance the aims 
of our research by helping the researcher to scientifically understand one of the 
research problems and provide an innovative solution with the further opportunity to 
examine its feasibility and effectiveness using associated evaluation methods. 
Therefore, the design science approach is deemed appropriate and more consistent 




3.3. Design Science Research (DSR) Methodology  
Design Science Research (DSR) is defined as a problem-solving paradigm for 
information system research, which aims to create innovative artefacts that define 
products, practices, ideas and technical capabilities through analysis, design, 
implementation, and management (Von Alan et al., 2004). DSR can be described as 
formulating design theories to solve a particular problem by developing artefacts 
including constructs, methods, models, human-computer interfaces, algorithms, or 
other artefacts (Walls et al., 1992) (Venable, 2006) (Gregor and Jones, 2007).  The 
literature has also shown some conditions and research missions that a research 
project has to fulfil to be classified as DSR. von Alan et al. (Von Alan et al., 2004)  
presented practical guidelines and argued that DSR should:  
1. Produce an applicable artefact such as construct, method or model. 
2. Develop technology-based solutions for relevant real-world problems. 
3. Demonstrate efficacy, quality, and utility of the design through well-executed 
evaluation methods. 
4. Produce a contribution through both the form of the artefact and the knowledge 
base of the design. 
5. Apply a methodology to construct and evaluate the artefact. 
6. Present the research results to technology- and management-oriented audiences.  
3.3.1. Design Science Research Process 
Vaishnavi et al. (Vaishnavi and Kuechler, 2015) introduced the process of DSR, 
starting with identifying a real-world problem and ending with appropriate 
conclusions, as shown in figure 1. The first phase defines a relevant problem that 
may derive from reviewing related work. The second phase uses this knowledge base 
to find and suggest feasible solutions to the problem being addressed. It is essentially 
a creative step wherein a formal proposal is produced based on a novel configuration. 
The third phase is developing the suggested solutions to construct the artefact. The 
fourth phase, once the artefact is constructed, is to evaluate it according to criteria 
that are usually made explicit within the research proposal. Evaluation is performed 
through testing the utility of the artefact, its usefulness, and its applicability. The fifth 











Figure 3-1 Design Science Research Process model (source  (Vaishnavi and Kuechler, 2015)) 
The design science research methodology was selected to conduct our research as it 
is highly relevant to information technology research. This methodology supports a 
paradigm of pragmatic research that creates innovative artefacts to solve real-world 
problems (Von Alan et al., 2004, Simon, 1996). This research is fundamentally 
constructive as it constructs a new, supported method. It aims to extend human 
capabilities, namely developers’ security knowledge, and achieve the desired 
outcomes by creating an innovative artefact. Thus, DSR methodology reaches to the 
core of what has been constructed, applied, evaluated, and improved upon in our 
research.   
The following section demonstrates how this research is designed in line with the 
design science research methodology and discusses the associated methods that were 
used to achieve the goals of this research.  
3.4. Mapping this research into a design science research model 
According to the DSR process, our research methodology consists of five work 






Figure 3-2 This research methodology, in relation to DSR methodology 
3.4.1. Problem Awareness phase  
This research project started by addressing a problem in industrial control system 
development environments. A search on the related literature was carried out to 




known as problem investigation, where information about the problem is collected 
and understood without yet solving it (Simon, 1996). The problem investigation 
process was classified in reference (Wieringa, 2009), based on its emphasis, into four 
categories, each of which leads to different views of the problem identification 
process: 
Problem-driven investigation: where problems need to be diagnosed before solving 
them. This investigation describes a phenomenon, formulates and tests hypotheses as 
to the causes of the problem and identifies its priorities.  
Goal-driven investigation: there is no problem experienced or that needs to be 
identified, but nevertheless there are reasons to change the world in order to reach 
some goal. This kind of investigation describes and operationalises stakeholder goals, 
and defines goal priorities.  
Solution-driven investigation: where a known solution is applied to new problems. 
This investigation includes identifying a new functionality and the utility of existing 
technology for solving new problems. 
Impact-driven investigation: this is also called the evaluation phase, where the 
outcome of past solutions is evaluated. This investigation identifies and explains the 
impacts of previously implemented solutions. 
In this research, the problem identification falls under the category of being a 
problem-driven investigation, which is conducted through reviewing related 
literature and conducting research interviews with domain experts, as shown in 
Figure 3-3. These studies give the researcher insight into the problem that control 





Figure 3-3 Research problem awareness and identification 
3.4.1.1. Systematic Literature Review. 
A systematic literature review was conducted to help the researcher recognise the 
relevant aspects of the research, which in any case is highly recommended in DSR 
guidelines (Von Alan et al., 2004). A systematic review is ”a means of identifying, 
evaluating and interpreting all available research relevant to a particular research 
question, or topic area, or phenomenon of interest” (Kitchenham et al., 2009).  
The researcher decided to conduct a systematic literature review due to the associated 
advantages highlited by reference (Kitchenham et al., 2009) as the following: 1) it 
less likely that the results of the review are biased. 2)  it provides rich information 
from findings across a wide range of previous studies, which provides consistent 
results as to evidence of the robust nature of the phenomenon or otherwise 
inconsistent results that can be further studied. 3) It is conducted according to a 
predefined search strategy that allows a researcher to synthesis existing work in a 
thorough and fair manner. However, systematic reviews require considerably more 
effort than conventional literature reviews.   
Our systematic literature review was based on the guidelines defined by reference 
(Kitchenham et al., 2009). The review consists of three main stages: the planning, 




In the planning phase, the research questions were defined for the review. The review 
protocol was also developed and evaluated. It was necessary to predefine the review 
protocol to reduce the possibility of research bias. The components of the protocol 
included the following elements: background, review aims and research questions, 
study selection criteria, and data extraction. Since this review was a part of PhD 
project, the protocol was reviewed by the researcher’s supervisors, as recommended 
in reference (Kitchenham et al., 2009). 
In the second phase, the review was conducted by applying inclusion and exclusion 
criteria, extracting information, and collecting data. The review was conducted to 
find as many related articles in the literature as possible. A list of sources was 
obtained including references, journals, conference proceedings and industrial 
websites. The sources were thoroughly searched based on our selection criteria. Data 
was collected in relation to the research questions. 
The last phase of the review included reporting and evaluating the results. The results 
of this review were reported and discussed in Chapter 2.     
3.4.1.2. Research interviews 
The design science research methodology can encompass methods from other 
paradigms such as using positivist paradigm methods for the evaluation process, or 
using interpretive paradigm methods for problem identification and other 
fundamental requirements (Weber, 2010). 
In this research, a number of interviews were conducted with control engineers to 
enrich the findings of the systematic literature review. The use of the interview 
method was deemed useful as it was expected to improve the understanding of the 
research problem. The interviews inclemently enhanced the knowledge gained from 
the literature by investigating the current security knowledge of control engineers, 
their need to design secure systems, existing security support, and security training 
methods. To this end, the research interview was designed to support awareness of 
the problem and assess engineers’ needs in order to develop control system security 




The three main types of research interviews are semi-structured, structured and un-
structured interviews (DiCicco‐Bloom and Crabtree, 2006). The use of semi-
structured interviews was preferred in this research as opposed to the other types 
because they are better suited to small samples to derive supplementary information 
(Laforest, 2009). In addition, semi-structured interviews keep the researcher focussed 
on the main aspects of the problem under consideration, while at the same time 
allowing the researcher to be open to any new ideas that may emerge during an 
interview process (DiCicco‐Bloom and Crabtree, 2006).  
Seven semi-structured interviews were conducted, recorded, transcribed and 
qualitatively analysed, as explained in Chapter 4.  
The data collected from both the literature review and research interviews, which are 
presented in Chapters 2 and 4, respectively, gave considerable insight into the 
research problem and helped to derive a novel solution of forming an adaptive 
security supported method. As a result, the research hypothesis was formalised and 
the research questions were set. However, the hypothesis was continuously evaluated 
and adjusted during the research process, as it represents the results of the entire body 
of this research. 
3.4.2 Suggestions phase 
Following the previous phase, the suggestion step is intended to allow a proposed 
solution in a tentative framework to be formalised (Offermann et al., 2009). This 
phase is essentially a creative step wherein a new security supported method was 
envisioned based on the use of a tailored on-the-job training approach.   
Our research presented a security supported framework, named ICS-SES, that can be 
configured into a development environment to be used by control system developers 
during their work to assist them in designing secure systems and, consequently, 
enhance their security awareness and skills, which is the main goal of this research. 
During this phase, the framework was produced by identifying its components and 





3.4.3 Development phase 
After identifying the problem of the lack of security knowledge and proposing a 
security supported solution, this solution then needs to be developed and evaluated 
in order to evaluate the outcomes of the entire research (Offermann et al., 2009). 
Development is a creative engineering process (Offermann et al., 2009). 
In this research, the intention of the development phase was to develop the proposed 
supported method in the form of an artefact, including the design and implementation 
processes. It was concerned with translating the proposed conceptual framework into 
an implemented tool, this process being called ‘forward engineering’ (Fernández-
López and Gómez-Pérez, 2002). This led to deciding which software development 
methodology would be undertaken and which techniques would be used.   
Software development methodology is defined by the IEEE society as “the 
application of a systemic, disciplined, quantifiable approach to the development, 
operation, and maintenance of software” (Radatz et al., 1990). The literature 
presented a number of development methods such as the waterfall, spiral, formal, 
agile and prototype methods, which are employed based on the type of project, 
changes in requirements, project size, complicity, etc. (Farrell, 2007) For example, 
the waterfall method is typically used when user requirements are stable and 
unchanging during system development (Bassil, 2012). Amongst the available 
development methodologies, the prototype method was chosen for developing the 
security supported tool because it provides an early view of functionality, which 
supports the process of changing and refining requirements if so needed 
(Bischofberger and Pomberger, 2012). The prototyping takes an iterative approach, 
which breaks the project into small segments and builds a prototype for each 
(Bischofberger and Pomberger, 2012). It is based on developing, examining, 
analysing, and refining the prototypes until they meet the appropriate requirements, 
which in our research are defined in the success criteria in Chapter 1, Section 1.5.  
A prototyping tool for the ICS-SES method was implemented and used in an 





3.4.4 Evaluation phase 
After clearly defining the research question and the constructed artefact reaching a 
sufficient state, it was necessary to select a suitable evaluation method (Vaishnavi 
and Kuechler, 2004). The evaluation phase is an important requirement in design 
science research (Cleven et al., 2009). The quality and efficacy of an artefact must 
be demonstrated via well-executed evaluation methods (Hevner and Chatterjee, 
2010). 
Evaluation can be achieved by means of action research, by conducting case studies, 
surveys, lab experiments or through simulation (Offermann et al., 2009). In design 
science research, the contribution is mostly the artefact itself, and hence it must be 
clearly validated and identified as a new research contribution (Hevner and 
Chatterjee, 2010). Artefacts can be assessed in terms of functionality, utility, 
performance, and other relevant quality attributes (Hevner and Chatterjee, 2010). In 
fact, the evaluation phase is intended to answer the question “How well does an 
artefact work?” (March and Smith, 1995). Evaluation can also provide essential 
feedback about the quality and design during the development phase (Hevner and 
Chatterjee, 2010).    
According to the evaluation guidelines presented by Hevener et al., effective 
evaluation requires the appropriate use of research methodologies from the 
knowledge base (Hevner and Chatterjee, 2010). Table 3.1 shows design science 
research evaluation methods as summarised by reference (Hevner and Chatterjee, 
2010). The use of one or more of the methods reported in table 3.1 can help the 
researcher to convince the research community as to the value and validity of the 





Table 3-1 Design Evaluation Methods 
(source: reference (Hevner and Chatterjee, 2010)) 
Experimental methods play an important role in software engineering evaluation as 
they allow researchers to contribute to the body of knowledge through observation 
and empirical evidence (Basili, 2007). They provide a scientific basis for software 
engineering (Wohlin et al., 2006). Experiments can be controlled experiments, where 
subjects are randomly assigned to different treatments, or quasi-experiments, which 
are used when random assignment cannot be performed (Wohlin et al., 2006).  
Controlled experiments provide the most rigorous evidence of any correlation 
relationships between the research tool and the outcomes (Hevner and Chatterjee, 
2010). They are highly controlled as they are based on fixed designs and more formal 
procedures than other empirical methods (Whitten, 1990). This advantage allows 
researchers to plan and design rigourous experimental studies that ensure a high 
degree of validity (Wohlin et al., 2006). Controlled experiments are often used when 
researchers need to evaluate changes in participants’ knowledge, skills, and 
behaviour (Wohlin et al., 2006). They are also used to demonstrate the effectiveness 




2010). Therefore, the controlled experiment method was selected to evaluate the 
usability of the educational tool in terms of effectiveness, efficiency, and ease of use.  
The experiment study design was based on the practical guidelines provided by 
reference (Ko et al., 2015) to allow the evaluation of software engineering tools with 
human participants in line with our research question “Can a supported tool assist 
developers in designing secure control systems?”, as introduced in Chapter 6. The 
results obtained are analysed and discussed in Chapter 7. 
3.4.5 Summarising Results and Drawing Conclusions  
The last phase of the research process is intended to summarise the research findings 
and draw appropriate conclusions, which clearly identify research contributions, and 
publish them in the form of PhD thesis, or conference or journal articles (Offermann 
et al., 2009). The fundamental assessment for any research is “what are the new 
contributions?” The authors of reference (Hevner and Chatterjee, 2010) stated that: 
“Effective design science research must provide clear contributions in 
the areas of the design artefact, design construction knowledge, and/or 
design evaluation knowledge.” (Hevner and Chatterjee, 2010)  
The design artefact contribution is the artefact itself, and will be such as a new tool, 
model or method that must be clearly evaluated and identified as a research 
contribution (Hevner and Chatterjee, 2010). The theoretical foundation’s 
contribution is one of extending and improving existing theoretical foundations 
within the knowledge base of the research by the creative use of a new construct 
(Hevner and Chatterjee, 2010). The evaluation methodology’s contribution is the 
creative use of a new evaluation method (Hevner and Chatterjee, 2010). 
The complete results of this research are published in a form of PhD thesis. The 
research findings were summarised and discussed in Chapter 8 . The original and 
complementary research contrubutions were outlined. New directions for future work 





This chapter discussed information system research paradigms and research 
methodology candidates for carrying out this research. The Design Science Research 
(DSR) Methodology was selected to carry out this research. DSR methodology is 
appropriate and more consistent with the purpose of our research as it enables the 
researcher to understand the research problem and change the situation pertaining to 
control system security engineering by providing a supported solution and using 
associated methods to evaluate the feasibility of the solution. In Section 3.2.4, the 
selection of the DSR methodology was discussed and justified in relation to this 
particular research characteristics. The chapter illustrates the main phases of DSR 
methodology and maps our research into the DSR process, resulting in the five work 
packages presented throughout this thesis.  
Next chapter presents a qualitative study assessing control system developers’ needs 






A Qualitative Study of Control System Developers’ 
Support Needs for Security Engineering 
 
Chapter Objectives 
• To identify the current level of security awareness and knowledge of control 
engineers 
• To enrich the understanding of ICS security engineering 
• To identify the needs of developers in designing secure control systems 
• To collect recommendations for the proposed framework 
 
4.1- Introduction 
This chapter presents a qualitative study that was carried out to enrich the 
understanding of the research problem and to capture the needs of developers in 
designing secure control systems. Research interviews were conducted with 
developers to explore the key issues of developing ICS security by design by 
synthesising the analysis of collected data in relation to the findings of the systematic 
literature review carried out in Chapter2. 
As based on NIST guidance for building security training programs, it is essential to 
conduct a needs assessment before designing the training in order to allocate 
appropriate resources and techniques to meet the identified training needs. NIST 
suggested a number of assessment techniques, including reviewing current related 
trends published in the academic, government, or industry literature, and conducting 
interviews with key trainees (Wilson and Hash, 2003). Therefore, This study was 
conducted to explore the current level of developers’ security knowledge and the 
needs of ICS developers in order to understand their support needs regarding security 
engineering. 
Initially, the aim of the interviews is discussed as a part of the research objectives 




justified, including participants’ backgrounds and interview questions. Section 4.4, 
where the researcher discusses the candidate methods for analysing the collected 
data, justifies the selection of Thematic Analysis approach and explains the analysis 
procedure. Finally, the interview findings are presented and discussed in relation to 
the results of the systematic literature review and the aims of this research. 
4.2- Aim of Interview   
The main purpose to conducting the interviews is to gain an understanding of the 
issues arising when designing secure control systems, with respect to the role of 
system developers, by exploring the key factors of ICS security by design and 
discovering the existing support methods. The collected data is expected to attain the 
following goals: 
Understanding the research problem: to gain further insight into the research 
problem identified earlier in Chapter 2 – that is, industrial control systems lacking 
security engineering by grasping the real situation relating to the design of control 
systems that is a part of the ‘awareness of the problem’ process in the DSR 
methodology, as discussed in Chapter 3, Section 3.4.1.2. In the context of the 
previous work, a number of interviews were conducted with domain experts to 
understand findings of the systematic review studied in Chapter 2. The interviews 
are intended to improve the knowledge gained from the literature in order to 
significantly enhance the understanding of the research problem and highlight the 
key issues required to find a solution by investigating the status of ICS development, 
current levels of security knowledge amongst ICS engineers, their security awareness 
regarding system design, and existing security support methods. 
Needs assessment: by understanding ICS developers’ needs and gathering their 
requirements. The collected data will help the researcher to identify the requirements 
of system developers in order that they pay increased attention to security during 
system design. The interviews are intended to identify developers’ needs when 
designing secure systems. They also investigate the motivation to improve the 
security knowledge that can help gain solutions to the problem defined by both the 
systematic review, as presented in Chapter 2, and the interviews discussed in this 




The qualitative data will be collected and analysed to partially answer the research 
questions introduced in Chapter 1 (Section 1.4) in order to contribute to the body of 
knowledge. The findings will illustrate the attitude of the developers toward applying 
security, the current obstacles to applying ICS security by design, and possible 
recommendations to overcome these obstacles.    
4.3 Design of Interview Process 
As this study involved human participants, it was essential to secure an ethical 
approval application before commencing data collection to ensure that it adheres to 
British Psychological Society (BPS) ethical guidelines. The ethical approval for the 
experiment was given by the Faculty Research Ethics Committee (FREC) 
(ref:1213/185) (Appendix B-1). It covered the issues related to respect participants; 
confidentiality of collected data and identity of participants; standard of self-
determination, so participants can withdraw partially or completely from the 
interview; and honest and accurate representation of collected data. 
The researcher applied the following guidelines prior to conducting the research 
interviews, as shown in Table 4.1: 
 





The interview sessions were conducted in a one-to-one format with the aid of semi-
structured interview questions, as presented in Appendix C.  
The next sub-sections explain and justify the design of the research interview 
including interviewee selection, the size of the sample, and the interview research 
questions. 
4.3.1- Surveyed Sample for Research Interview 
This section presents the surveyed sample for the purpose of qualitative data 
collection. Interviewees were selected from a group of engineers pertinent to this 
research. The main criterion used in the selection process was that respondents be 
involved in the control system development process, and have previously worked in 
an industrial environment. This is to ensure that they have experience in developing 
control systems so that they can identify the issues of designing secure ICS within 
real development environments. 
It is necessary, in order to conduct the research interviews, to estimate the sample 
size prior to data collection (Guest et al., 2006). Thus, related literature and guidelines 
for qualitative sample sizes were reviewed to ascertain a suitable sample size for an 
exploratory interview. Based on the survey of sampling size for qualitative research 
conducted by Guest et al., the majority of the literature recommended that sampling 
should continue until theoretical saturation occurs (Guest et al., 2006). Guest et al. 
carried out a study of sixty women, although their findings showed that data 
saturation had occurred as early as after their first six interviews.  
Other researchers suggested guidelines for actual sample sizes that vary from one to 
hundreds. Baker et al. stated that a small sample, between six and a dozen, can be 
sufficient when a target population is a specific group or in some way hard to access 
(Baker et al., 2012). Morse suggested a guideline that recommends at least six 
participants during qualitative study (Morse, 1994). Creswell recommended between 
five to twenty-five participants (Creswell, 2012). Kuzel recommended that six to 
eight interviews should be sufficient for a homogeneous sample (Kuzel, 1992). 
Similarly, six interviews were conducted by Hanid in her study, and were felt to 
constitute a sufficient sample size (Hanid, 2014). Accordingly, studies involving a 




In an attempt to explore issues related to the design of secure control systems and 
identifying the needs of system developers, the researcher conducted seven 
interviews. The sample size was considered suitable for three reasons. First, the 
sample size is commonly used for a homogenous population, as described in the 
above literature. Secondly, the number of interviews covers all essential elements of 
the research questions. Thirdly, the study explores the current security awareness and 
knowledge among control engineers and the currently available support, while at the 
same time increasing the understanding of developers’ needs and their attitudes 
toward security training support. These requirements provide the impetus to 
formulate better support for system developers in the design of secure systems. By 
doing so, the successful implementation of security support will meet developers’ 
needs and help them to develop ICS security by design.  
The researcher conducted seven interviews, two face-to-face, one by Skype 
interview, with the remaining four being phone interviews. The respondents were 
targeted based on their experience and their profiles on the university system and 
LinkedIn network. The individuals making up the sample worked in control system 
development in different countries including Libya, United Kingdom, India, 
Malaysia, Saudi Arabia and Belgium. Currently, two of the seven participants are 
working as lecturers, whilst the remaining five are Ph.D. students doing research on 
control systems engineering.      
Every respondent was given a unique reference for the purpose of anonymity and 
fulfilling the requirements of ethical approval, as shown in Table 4.2. References 
were used during the data analysis process for better following and understanding, as 












Organisation Current wok 
Interview 
Method 
P1 System developer De Montfort University, 
UK 
Lecturer Face-to-face 
P2 Control Engineer De Montfort University, 
UK 
PhD student Phone call 
P3 System Designer Ku Leuven, Belgium PhD student Skype call 
P4 System Designer De Montfort university, 
UK 
Lecturer Face-to-face 
P5 Control Engineer De Montfort University, 
UK 
PhD student Phone call 
P6 Control Engineer De Montfort University, 
UK 
PhD student Phone call 
P7 System designer De Montfort University, 
UK 
PhD student Phone call 
Table 4-2 Participants’ information 
4.3.2- Interview Questions 
The interview questions were designed as based on the aims of this study, which is 
that of enriching the understanding of the research problem and identifying 
developers’ needs in terms of designing secure control systems (see Section 4.2). The 
study objectives were derived from fundamental issues revealed by the literature 
review presented in Chapter 2. The questions were grouped into three main sections 
(see Appendix C 1) and applied in the interview for data collection.  
 “Current security awareness and knowledge.” 
The interviewees were asked about control system security concerning the 
development process, including several probe sub-questions, as shown in Table 4.3. 
The questions were developed to explore awareness regarding ICS security issues, 




investigated the interviewees’ current security knowledge by providing an example 
of the control system and asking the participants to identify where security could be 
applied to enhance the security level of a given system.  
“Current support for developing secure ICS.” 
The participants were asked about the technologies used in system design, security-
based technical assistance, and security training. The information gathered in this 
section will be used to explore the real-world circumstances of the development 
process and identifies the currently available support for designing secure systems.   
 “Developers’ needs and requirements for security by design.” 
The proposal of developing a security training support mechanism was introduced 
and explained to the participants. The participants then were invited to identify any 
required support and desirable features. The information collected from this section 
identifies developers’ needs, which were transferred to the form of IT requirements 
for the proposed support method.  
Table 4.3 provides the justification for the interview research questions. The table 
explains the reasons for the proposed questions, referring to the research questions 
and the answers expected from the respondents. 
Two documents were used in the interview. The first was a consent form, which the 
participants were required to sign before starting the conversation, whilst the second 
included the interview questions that were used by the researcher as a guide - see 
Appendix C. The interviews took place between 11:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. on working 
days. Each interview took about half an hour.  
All participants permitted the researcher to use a voice recorder during interviews 
from which transcripts were produced so as to be able to apply an analytical 







INTERVIEW QUESTIONS INTERVIEW PROMPT 
RELATED RESEARCH 
QUESTION 
1- What are the security 
issues related to the 
Industrial Control 
Systems field? 
To reveal awareness of ICS 
security issues  
Part of research question 
RQ 1 
2- In your opinion, at which 
phase of development 
cycle should security 
concerns become 
involved? 
To reveal the awareness 
of the importance of 
security by design 
Part of research question 
RQ 1 
3- How do you determine 
whether your system 
design is secure? 
To reveal the awareness 
of security guidelines and 
recommendations 
Part of research question 
RQ 1 
4- From your perspective, 
what are the most 
important security rules 
that developers should 
follow in order to design 
secure systems? 
To reveal current levels of 
security skills  
Part of research question 
RQ 1,2 
5- Example discussion: 
if you design this system, 
where will you consider 
security policies? 
To reveal the current level 
of security knowledge 
related to ICS security by 
design 
Part of research question 
RQ1,2 
6- Do you know secure 
design patterns or 
guidelines?  
To reveal the awareness 
of security design patterns 
Part of research question 
RQ1 
7-  How do you select the 
security patterns? 
To reveal the current 
methods that can be used 
in selecting security 
patterns 
Part of research question 
RQ1,2 
8- What do you use for 
modelling? Does that tool 
support system security? 
To reveal the currently 
available support related 
to design secure ICS  
Part of research question 
RQ1,2 
9- Have you attended any 
security training 
program? 
To reveal the available 
security training programs 
and approaches 
Part of research question 
RQ1,2 
10- What kind of support 
could improve security 
knowledge of control 
engineers? 
To reveal developers’ 
needs and requirements 
Part of research question 
RQ 2 
11- What are features that 
would make a training 
tool more useful for 
engineers? 
To reveal developers’ 
requirements that would 
help in designing the 
training tool  
Part of research question 
RQ 2 
12- What are features of 
training tools that distract 
from learning? 
To reveal undesirable 
features to be avoided 
when designing the 
training tool  
Part of research question 
RQ 2 




4.4- Data analysis 
This section discusses the analytic methods applied to the data collected during the 
interviews. First, the qualitative data analysis approaches are reviewed, followed by 
the selected analysis approach, as presented and justified in Section 4.4.1. Then, the 
analysis process is explained in Section 4.4.2.  
Having an interview plan and design, it was then appropriate to consider selecting a 
suitable approach for data analysis. The approaches commonly used in qualitative 
data analysis are thematic analysis and content analysis (Vaismoradi et al., 2013). 
Vaismoradi et al. conducted a comparison study to discuss the boundaries between 
the two approaches (Vaismoradi et al., 2013). Their findings showed that qualitative 
thematic analysis and content analysis have many similarities; however, the main 
difference is that content analysis aims to quantify content in a systematic manner. 
The above study concluded that both approaches can answer the same set of research 
questions, and they are robust enough to be used to conduct a research study. 
However, the authors believe that the quality of the data analysis depends on the 
effort spent by a researcher on the process of data collection and analysis, as well as 
the resulting interpretation and synthesis (Vaismoradi et al., 2013).  
Although both approaches can be applied to the data collected in this research, 
thematic analysis approach was selected for the following reasons. First, it is the most 
widely used method to analyse interviews (Jugder, 2014). Secondly, “rigorous 
thematic approach can produce an insightful analysis that answers particular 
research questions” (Braun and Clarke, 2006). Also, this method complemented the 
purpose of this research by investigating interview data from two perspectives: the 
data perspective, which is driven through the coding process, and the research 
question perspective, whereby the data was checked to determine if it was consistent 
and answered the research questions. Finally, thematic analysis is an accessible and 
theoretically-flexible approach that can be used across a range of research questions 
and epistemologies (Braun and Clarke, 2006). 
4.4.1 Thematic Analysis Approach 
The qualitative thematic analysis approach was used to analyse the data collected in 




identifying, analyzing and reporting patterns (themes) within data” (Braun and 
Clarke, 2006). Thematic analysis can be based on prior categories, such as pre-
figured or objective, or on categories that only emerge as the analysis proceeds 
(Braun and Clarke, 2006).  
In the literature, a number of procedures were suggested to guide the thematic 
analysis of qualitative data. Creswell, and Miles and Huberman, recommended a 
three-stage analysis procedure, as follows: (Creswell, 2012) (Miles and Huberman, 
1994)  
1- Preparing the data for analysis by transcribing,  
2- Reducing the data into themes through a process of coding, and  
3- Representing the data. 
Braun and Clarke stated that themes are identified through a rigorous process of data 
analysis, including the following main steps: 
1- Data familiarisation,  
2- Data coding, and  
3- Theme development and revision. 
Braun and Clarke also suggested splitting the above stages further into six phases, 
including familiarising with data, generating initial codes, searching for themes, 
reviewing themes, defining and naming themes, and producing the report (Braun and 
Clarke, 2006).  
The next section explains the application of the thematic analysis approach to the 
qualitative data collected in the interviews. 
4.4.2 Analysis procedure  
The data were gathered through interviews with control system developers. Data 
analysis was guided by thematic analysis procedures as discussed in the previous 
section. The analysis process starts early in the data collection when the researcher 
begins to notice patterns within issues of interest in the data, and is ended by the 
reporting of the results of the analysis (Braun and Clarke, 2006).    
Initially, audio records of the seven interviews were directly transcribed, as all 
interviews were conducted in the English language. Records were listened to many 




Second, the coding process, where the transcripts were coded to capture important 
themes that represented patterned responses within the dataset.  In thematic analysis, 
themes or patterns can be identified either in an inductive way or in a deductive 
(theoretical) way (Braun and Clarke, 2006).  Inductive analysis, namely data-driven, 
is the process of coding the data without the researcher’s assumptions or a pre-existed 
code frame, which means the themes are entirely linked to the data themselves 
(Patton, 1990). In contrast, deductive or theoretical analysis, namely analyst-driven, 
tends to be driven by the researcher’s direct interests (Braun and Clarke, 2006). This 
means the analyst pays most attention to themes that have already been identified in 
previous research. This form of analysis provides greater detail as to certain aspects 
of the data in relation to the research questions. The choice between the two coding 
approaches maps onto the purpose of this study. Therefore, the researcher decided to 
choose deductive analysis to carry out the coding process. 
The transcripts were thoroughly read and reread, and the data examined line by line 
to identify important codes by labelling relevant pieces that aligned with the research 
questions, as presented in the next section.  
The coding process was performed manually, instead of using qualitative data 
analysis software, for a number of reasons: first, using analysis software is 
recommended when the sample size is large and can consume a considerable amount 
of the researcher’s time. However, in small-scale samples, as in this study of seven 
interviews, manual analysis is recommended (Saldaña, 2015). Secondly, using 
software packages in the data analysis has no advantage over manual analysis 
(Halkier and Jensen, 2011). Furthermore, the most significant consideration for this 
research is that manual coding enriches the researcher’s understanding and 
familiarity with the data (Scott, 2013).    
At the third stage, that of theme development and revision, the codes were read, 
revised and aggregated to identify significant or recurring patterns that produced 
potential themes, as discussed in the results presented in the next section. First, the 
number of codes were reduced by extracting only the most important codes directly 
related to the study. Then, correlated codes were grouped under themes that were 
further reduced to conceptualising and generalising the data, as stated in reference 




The next section presents and explains the results of the analysis procedure applied 
to the qualitative data collected in interviews. 
4.5- Results 
This section presents the result of qualitative data analysis demonstrated in the 
previous section. Interview data were analysed with an emphasis on the purpose of 
this study. The preliminary results returned 108 codes; see Appendix C-2, that were 
further aggregated into twelve themes, as shown in Figure 4.1. The themes were 
further aggregated into main five themes: ICS design lack security, ICS Developers 
have some security awareness, ICS Developers lack security knowledge, ICS 
Developers lack support for design secure ICS, ICS Developers’ requirements to 












The final analysis step, as recommended by reference (Braun and Clarke, 2006), is 
that of extracting related examples from the transcripts for developed themes, and 
relating these themes to the research questions. Table 4.4 shows the themes in relation 
to the topics investigated in the interviews, with some demonstrative examples of 
responses.  
The results illustrate that ICS are developed without security considerations, as stated 
by [P5] “we focus on controlling, we don’t think about security…”, another 
participant [P4] said “a lot of control systems are not secure, they can be modified, 
there is no access control…, systems tested just for functionality and performance”. 
However, responses show some awareness of the importance of security, for 
example: “If the system is connected with other systems, I think you need security. 
As long as I have this connectivity, yes, should have security features…” by [P4], 
“because of industrial Internet of things, indutrie 4.0, and the interaction with cloud, 
I think all phases should have security” by [P3].  
The responses also show that ICS developers lack security knowledge; for example, 
“I do believe that system should be secured, but my background is far away from 
security…” by [P2], another respondent said “we never been taught how to protect 
our system” [P7]. 
The respondents claim that they lack support, as stated by [P4] “none of the tools 
allow you to do security…”; [P2] said “The biggest issue in ICS security is the 
training, we don’t do regular training, or workshops…”. They stated that they needed 
training support: “We need support thorough learning, we need to understand 
security, understand the principles…” by [P1], a usable tool, “we need a tool that 
gives suggestions for security, suggest some patterns to choose from,…” by [P3], 
security guidelines, “we need guidelines to follow, we need knowledge given by 
security engineer, to know what kind of security is appropriate…” [P7], and that they 
need support during system development, as [P7] said “we need security solutions 
according to our needs, I mean system, and corresponding learning material to 
understand weaknesses in our system,…” Similarly, [P3] said “the tools we use don’t 











“In the past, security wasn't critical thing... but now the 
Internet increases the importance of security” [p1] 
“After using the Internet, there are security issues that 
carry risks…, systems should be secured from scratch…” 
[p2]  
“Security wasn't a problem, but now it is... because of 
industrial Internet of things, indutrie 4.0, and the 
interaction with cloud, I think all phases should have 
security” [p3] 
“If the system is connected with other systems, I think you 
need security. As long as I have this connectivity, yes, 
should have security features…” [p4] 
“It has to be done properly, of course, at the beginning of 
the design stage” [p4]  
“It is better to implement security from the beginning” [p5] 








“we care about functionality more than security…” [P1] 
“we don’t focus on security…” [P2] 
“we deliver systems without security…” [P3]  
“a lot of control systems are not secure, they can be 
modified, there is no access control…, systems tested just 
for functionality and performance” [p4] 
“we focus on controlling, we don’t think about 
security…” [p5] 
“none of the tool allow you to do security…” [P4] 
“we rely on the vendor or third party for security, we 
choose a good vendor” [P6] 
“we can’t do much about security, we don’t have the 
flexibility to do security…” [P7] 
ICS design lack 
security 
“I don’t know about security….” [P1] 
“I do believe that system should be secured, but my 
background is far away from security…” [P2] 
“The biggest issue in ICS security is the training, we don’t 
do regular training, or workshops…” [P2] 
“We have ‘zero’ knowledge on security, we need training, 
workshops” [P3] 
“no security training, even in my education…” [P4] 
“I don’t have good security background, I’ve done training 
course before, but it’s very general…” [P5] 








secure ICS  
“we don’t do regular training, or workshops…” [P2] 
“the tools we use don’t allow us to include security or to 
model security property…” [P3] 
“none of the tool allow to do security…” [P4] 
“Tools don’t support security…, no security training…” 
[P5] 
“nothing supports you to do security, no understanding, 
and the tool I’m using doesn’t allow me…” [P6] 
“There is no guideline, engineering methodologies don’t 
include security, there is no common concept for security 
of any methodology…” [P7] 
ICS Developers 
lack support for 






“we need support thorough learning, we need to 
understand security, understand the principles…” [P1] 
“we should connected with security experts, we should be 
working together or have regular meeting…” [P2] 
 “we need a tool that gives suggestions for security, 
suggest some patterns to choose from…” [P3] 
“we need to understand security, we need something 
simple and efficient, security is complex, avoid 
complication…” [P4] 
“we need to know how similar problems solved, we need 
personal support…” [P5] 
“we need to understand weaknesses, we need training 
courses…” [P6] 
” we need guidelines to follow, we need knowledge given 
by security engineer, to know what kind of security is 
appropriate…” [P7] 
“we need security solutions according to our needs, I mean 
system, configurable solutions, and corresponding 
learning material to understand weaknesses in our system, 
in understandable language…” [P7]  
“we never been taught how to protect our system, or how 
to implement security…” [P7] 
ICS Developers’ 
requirements to 
design secure ICS 
Table 4-4 Results of data analysis  
Table 4.5 summarises the interviews’ findings in relation to those revealed by the 
literature review. In the past, ICS security was not a concern where ICSs were 
isolated from external networks, and where the emphasis was on other requirements 
such as performance and functionality (Drias et al., 2015). However, since the ICSs 
began to be connected with the Internet by adopting IT technologies, security 
becomes a necessary requirement of developing ICS (Drias et al., 2015) (Durrani et 




this necessity and showed a readiness to improve system security, they do not 
generally consider security in system design; rather, they focus only on functionality 
and safety, which ultimately leads to delivering ICSs with security weaknesses.  
Systematic Literature Review Findings Interview Findings 




Security is becoming a 
real concern for both 
ICS vendors and 
owners  
 (Drias et al., 2015  
(Durrani, 2013 #256)   
(Fernandez et al., 2011)  
Internet connectivity 
increases the need of 
security 
(P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, 
P7) 
ICSs are not 
sufficiently secured 
and need more 
research effort 
(Hadziosmanovic et al., 
2012) 
(Krotofil and Gollmann, 
2013) 
ICSs are delivered 
without security 
(P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, 
p6 P7) 
The importance of ICS 
security by design 
(Fernandez et al., 2011) 
(Zineddine, 2016) 2016)  
(Fernandez et al., 2008) 
(Oates, 2005) 
(Ur-Rehman and Zivic, 
2015) 
Security should be 
implemented from the 
beginning; at all 
development phases 
(P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, 
P7) 
ICS vendors and 
security professional 
must bridge the gap 
and work together for 
feasible solutions 
(Yang and Zhao, 2014)  
(Kunsman et al., 2015) 
(Brundle and Naedele, 
2008)  
(Zineddine, 2016) 
The need to connect 
with security engineers 
and working together 
(P2, P3, P4, P7) 
ICS Security awareness 
and education is a real 
concern   
 
(Amaechi and Counsell, 
2012) (Boyes, 2015) 
 (Miyachi and Yamada, 
2014)  (Durrani et al., 2013) 
(Vaughn Jr and Morris, 
2016)  
The training is most 
important in improving 
ICS security 
(P4, P7) 
Lack of security 
awareness and 
knowledge 
(Amaechi and Counsell, 
2012) (Savola and Ahonen, 
2006) (Vaughn Jr and 
Morris, 2016) (Graham et 
al., 2016) (Axelrod, 2011)  
(Ismail et al., 2014)  
Lack of security 
knowledge 
(P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, 
P6, P7) 
Recommendation for 
educate developers in 
 (Foo et al., 2013) 
(Nelso and Chaffin, 2011)  
The need of security 
training support 





security and best 
practice  
The need of methods 
and tools that support 
ICS security 
engineering  
(CPNI, 2016)  
(ICS-CERT)  
(Motii et al., 2015)  




Table 4-5 The interview findings in relation to the findings of the literature review 
4.6- Discussion 
The data collected from the respondents’ interviews are presented graphically, as 
presented in Figure 4.1 in Section 4.5, and narratively in the previous section. This 
section discusses and provides an interpretation of the findings through reviewing 
and summarising the study results in response to the research questions, and in 
reference to the previous literature that was systematically reviewed in Chapter 2.  
The participants were asked about ICS security engineering regarding the need for 
security, development processes, security background, guidelines and standards, tool 
support, and training support. The information collected was to enrich the 
understanding of ICS security engineering within the ICS developers’ community.  
Based on the analysis given in the previous sections, this study revealed two key 
reasons for the lack of security consideration throughout the system development 
cycle. First, ICS developers do not have sufficient security knowledge to implement 
security in their systems. Ordinarily, they do not have any security training or 
education, as one of the respondents said “We never been taught how to protect our 
system, or how to implement security…” [P7]. The lack of security training was also 
outlined in the literature as one of the main problems associated with ICS security 
(Vaughn Jr. and Morris, 2016) (Graham et al., 2016).  
The second key issue is a lack of support. The respondents claimed that they lack 
security support in both technical, i.e., within the system development environment, 
and training, support. Although the literature proposed several support methods, most 
of which are developed for risk assessment, which support the security of the system 
at the operational level, they do not focus on the learning aspect, mainly providing 




also stressed the importance of the learning aspect of any proposed method (Annex, 
2011). 
To summarise, the results of this study clearly stressed the need of support within the 
system development process to increase the potential for obtaining security by 
design. The information collected in the interviews enriched the understanding of the 
problem and identified the key factors for improving ICS security at the structural 
level throughout the system development cycle. The study shows that ICS developers 
do not pay attention to the system security aspect. However, they are willing to 
enhance their current situation through various initiatives such as training support, 
security guidelines, and security-related techniques.  
 
4.7- Conclusion 
This chapter presented a qualitative research study to explore the problem of building 
insufficiently secured control systems. Interviews with ICS developers were 
conducted to gather their views in terms of security engineering and to identify their 
needs. The objectives of the study were met through the findings obtained from the 
interview analysis process. The results of the study were consistent with the results 
obtained from the systematic literature review presented in Chapter 2. The systematic 
review revealed a number of challenges in building secure control systems. However, 
conducting the interview study further supported the empirical evidence of the issues 
reported relating to ICS security. In addition, the results of the research interviews 
complemented the understanding of these problems and clearly indicated the current 
knowledge gap - which this research will contribute to by filling - by adding new 
insights into ICS security from the perspective of the participants in this study. The 
contribution of this study is that it is the first such attempt, to the best of our 
knowledge, to explore the needs of control system developers in enabling a security 
by design approach. The study revealed that control systems lack security 
engineering for two key reasons: first, control system developers lack security 
training; second, developers lack support for security engineering throughout the 
development cycle. The findings drew attention to the role of developers in building 
secure control systems and derived a solution in the form of an educationally 




The chapter discussed the main issues associated with the interview design, selected 
appropriate participants, and the sample size was justified on the basis of all the 
factors that might theoretically have helped the researcher to determine a suitable 
size for this study. In addition, the data analysis method was discussed and justified, 
followed by the study findings and discussion in relation to the results of the 
systematic literature review and the research questions. 
The next chapter elaborates on the proposed framework for supporting ICS 







Industrial Control System Security Engineering 
Support (ICS-SES) Framework 
Chapter objectives 
• To introduce the proposed method for supporting ICS developers in designing 
secure systems 
• To demonstrate the proposed pattern-based security guide  
• To demonstrate the proposed embedded training method 
• To present the ICS-SES framework for supporting ICS security engineering 
• To illustrate ICS-SES architecture  
• To explain the workflow supporting the ICS security engineering process 
 
5.1-Introduction 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 4 showed that there is a need to support ICS developers to 
improve their security knowledge such that they are better able to build secure control 
systems. This chapter introduces a novel framework that is intended to support ICS 
developers in designing secure systems by bridging the associated knowledge gap 
and improving their security knowledge. The originality of our method lies in its 
assembly of two methods, namely Pattern-based Security Guide and Embedded 
Security Training, to assist system designers in improving their security skills and 
their understanding of security in general, and by consequence enabling ICS security 
by design. The support method is based on the adaption of security design patterns, 
a problem-based learning approach, on-the-job security training, tailored training, 
and technical innovations.   
Our method focuses on supporting ICS developers in two main dimensions. First, it 
provides technical support by guiding developers as to the selection of a suitable 
security design pattern to be configured in a system model as based on the required 
security property required to mitigate a security flaw that has become apparent. 
Second, it provides a knowledge dimension by suggesting personalised learning 




patterns. Figure 5.1 demonstrates the proposed method in relation to the research 










Figure 5-1 Proposed method in relation to the research problem and research aims 
This chapter is organised into the following sections: Section 5.2 introduces the ICS 
Security Engineering Support (ICS-SES) framework that integrates two methods of 
a ‘Pattern-Based Security Guide’, which outlines the process of pattern selection, and 
‘Embedded Security Training’, which demonstrates the training process, and 
explains the entire support process. Section 5.3 outlines the system requirements for 
the ICS-SES tool. Section 5.4 introduces the ICS-SES architecture and discusses the 
development process. Section 5.5 demonstrates the ICS-SES workflow and explains 
the process of supporting security by design using security guides and security 
training. Section 5.6 summarises this chapter. 
5.2- Industrial Control System Security Engineering Support (ICS-
SES) Framework  
5.2.1- The Rationale behind the ICS-SES Framework 
This section provides insight into the approaches that motivated our proposed support 
method and the techniques that were used in the ICS-SES framework. 
ICS developers lack 
security knowledge 
ICS developers lack 
technical support 





Bridge the gap between 















The Problem-Based Learning (PBL) method was adopted in our supported 
framework by providing security guidance and training based on a deliberate security 
flaw produced by an engineer during system design. PBL has been defined by 
Barrows and Tamblyn as “the basic human learning process that allowed primitive 
man to survive in his environment,…, it is the learning that results from the process 
of working toward the understanding or resolution of a problem.” (Barrows and 
Tamblyn, 1980). PBL strategy has been applied in engineering education for many 
years across a variety of professional engineering schools using numerous types of 
problems based on the nature of the discipline (Jonassen and Hung, 2008, Mills and 
Treagust, 2003). For example, PBL has been applied in chemical engineering 
(Woods, 1996),  architecture (Donaldson, 1989, Maitland, 1991), and to solve design 
problems (Cawley, 1989). PBL offers good prospects for learning, especially with 
the aid of guided teaching and tutorials (Perrenet et al., 2000). By using our problem-
based security learning, ICS developers can be more self-regulated and effectively 
transfer any skills attained into real-world scenarios and retain knowledge for a 
longer time than is generally associated with more traditional learning methods 
(Norman and Schmidt, 2016).  
Our supported training method was designed as on-the-job-based learning, where 
security learning is embedded in everyday work. On-the-job training (OTJ) is one of 
the Higher Education industries’ methods for developing required competences 
within their graduates by the transferral of skills into working experience (Bernardo 
et al., 2014); indeed, most of the learning occurs in the work setting itself (Jacobs, 
2003). Training has been defined by NIST as follows “The ‘Training’ level of the 
learning continuum strives to produce relevant and needed security skills and 
competencies by practitioners of functional specialties other than IT security (e.g., 
management, systems design and development, acquisition, auditing).” NIST Special 
publication-800 (Wilson and Hash, 2003). 
OTJ training is commonly acknowledged as being a useful method, such as learning 
by solving problems in the workplace (Boud and Rooney, 2015). The use of well-
planned OTJ training enables workers to effectively learn new skills that meet 
organisational needs (Rothwell and Kazanas, 2004). It also leads to high-quality 
service as employees continuously improve the quality of the product, and they 




addition, our embedded security training targets ICS engineers who typically learn 
through practise by ‘doing’ or observing in the workplace (Rooney et al., 2014). 
Therefore, OTJ security training can significantly improve the performance of ICS 
developers in terms of designing secure systems (Saks and Burke‐Smalley, 2014).  
Using the on-the-job training method requires a technique that is capable of 
delivering tailored training to be employed. An automated planner was used in order 
to provide personalised support to a system engineer.   
In the learning context, personalisation is also referred to as individualized learning  
(Sebba et al., 2007). However, using the term ‘individualised learning’ is a bit 
unrealistic and places more pressure to provide the exact materials required for each 
individual learner (Johnson, 2004). By contrast, ‘personalised learning’ is more 
suitable as it can refer to learning in a small group or even down to being on a one-
to-one basis (Sebba et al., 2007). Therefore, the term ‘personalised training’ is used 
in this thesis rather than ‘individualised training’. 
Since offering personalised learning programs can promote better learning (Garrido 
et al., 2011), our  security training method was designed to meet the personal needs 
of ICS developers through the adoption of an automated planning technique.   
5.2.2- Pattern-Based Security Guide 
The Security Guide proposed in this research is based on the use of security patterns 
to assist designers in securing their systems. Security patterns (see review, Chapter 
2, Section 2.2.7) were used to bridge the cultural gap between security experts and 
ICS developers by capturing security expertise in the form of security patterns.  
Researchers have already attempted to integrate security patterns into system 
development cycles in software engineering (Fernandez-Buglioni, 2013) (Maña et 
al., 2013) (Arjona et al., 2014) (Nguyen, 2015) (Hamid et al., 2016). However, to the 
best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to provide a practical pattern-based 
security guide that employs security patterns and supports their selection in ICS 




Our security guide initially takes the result of an external security scanner as its input, 
including a security problem and a vulnerable asset. Then, it guides system designers 
to select appropriate security design patterns to allow them to solve the associated 
security problems.   
The following subsections discuss the development of the security patterns catalogue 
and explain the pattern selection process.  
5.2.2.1- Vulnerability-based Security Patterns Catalogue 
Security patterns have been classified in a number of studies with respect to various 
dimensions (Mouratidis, 2006) (Nelso and Chaffin, 2011) (Schumacher et al., 2013) 
(Motii et al., 2015) (ICS-CERT). However, none of these studies proposed a 
systematically means of directly mapping between system vulnerabilities and 
security patterns. As discussed in the above sections, this security guide is intended 
to guide an engineer in the selection of applicable security solutions, here presented 
as security design patterns, based on an indentified vulnerability. Therefore, it was 
necessary to create a catalogue that systematically relates security patterns with 
system design security flaws in relation to vulnerable assets, potential risks and 
security requirements. The catalogue was created by adapting the ICS-CERT 
category (Nelso and Chaffin, 2011) and Motii et al.’s classification (Motii et al., 
2015), as shown in Figure 5.2. ICS-CERT published common ICS vulnerabilities 
with a list of related security threats, while in Motii et al. classification, security 
patterns were guided by a security risk assessment by identifying security 
requirements and relating them to security patterns based on Non-Functional 
Requirements (NFR), i.e., the NFR-based approach proposed by Weiss and 











Figure 5-2 Vulnerability-based security patterns Catalogue  
(based on references  (Nelso and Chaffin, 2011) (Motii et al., 2015)) 
Both classification systems were thoroughly reviewed and linked where necessary. 
The catalogue was developed by relating each vulnerability to a set of applicable 
security patterns that satisfy the security requirements derived from the potential 
risks associated with a particular asset’s vulnerabilities. 
ICS Assets were categorised into four main categories based on ICS-CERT: centre 
controller (e.g., HMI, SCADA server), field controller (e.g., PLC, RTU, IED) and 
field units (e.g., actuators, meters, sensors) and network communication.  
ICS-CERT categorisation of vulnerabilities was also adopted, including those of 
improper input validation, improper authentication, improper access control, lack of 
audit and accountability, lack of backup facilities, unencrypted sensitive data, and 
improper software configuration and management.  
Security risks were classified based on the work of Masood (Masood, 2016) that used 
Microsoft's STRIDE model (Howard and LeBlanc, 2003), namely Spoofing, 
Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service, and Elevation 
of Privilege. All risks identified in reference (Motii et al., 2015) were categorized 




The generic security requirements for ICS include mutual authentication, 
confidentiality, authorisation, data integrity, non-repudiation, system security 
capability monitoring, and audit and availability (Masood, 2016).  
Concrete security design patterns were categorised into a set of abstract security 
patterns based on Fernandez et al.  including authentication, authorization,  security 
logger and auditor (Fernandez-Buglioni, 2013). Abstract security patterns were 
assigned to security requirements as suggested by Motii et al. (Motii et al., 2015) 
The catalogue was created to guide and enable the automated process of pattern 
selection, so the tool can automatically derive a number of security pattern candidates 
with regards to a security problem that has become apparent, as explained in the next 
section.  
5.2.2.2- Security Pattern Selection 
Selecting an appropriate security pattern plays an important role in pattern-based 
secure system engineering methodology. Over the last decade, there has been 
considerable effort expended in undertaking this subject. Weiss and Mouratidis 
proposed a pattern selection method by formalising a security pattern in Goal-
oriented Requirements Language (GRL) based on security properties and threats 
(Weiss and Mouratidis, 2008). Hasheminejad and Jalili used a text processing 
approach and learning techniques in their proposed method for automatic pattern 
selection (Hasheminejad and Jalili, 2009). Fernandez et al. presented a pattern-based 
development methodology with respect to multidimensional pattern classification 
according to the development phase (Fernandez et al., 2011). A classification was 
proposed that relies on the application domain, pattern recognition needs and security 
properties (e.g., confidentiality, integrity, accountability, availability, authorisation 
and authentication) (Bunke et al., 2012).  
The intention behind our pattern selection process is to find a set of security design 
pattern candidates that satisfy the security requirements identified as based on a 
security vulnerability in a system model. The selection method is guided by the 
security pattern catalogue developed, as presented in the previous section. It follows 
four main steps: first, security risks are identified based on a given security 




to security risks associated with a vulnerability. Third, abstract security patterns are 
selected to satisfy the security requirements issued. Lastly, related concrete security 
patterns are identified and provided to a system designer to be integrated and 
evaluated.   
For example, the selection process for a vulnerable system network that has an 
unencrypted sensitive data flaw, which has been detected by an external security 
analyst, is as following:  
Step 1: identifying security risks associated with the detected vulnerability, 
‘unencrypted sensitive data’, which are spoofing, tampering and information 
disclosure, and the ICS asset ‘network’. 
Step 2: according to the security risks identified in Step 1, three security requirements 
are identified, namely ‘confidentiality of data, integrity of data, and mutual 
authentication’.   
Step 3: abstract security pattern, Virtual Private Network (VPN), was selected to 
satisfy the security requirements issued in Step 2 that are applicable to the ICS asset.  
Step 4: VPN security pattern has two concrete security patterns: IPsec VPN and TLS 
VPN. 
The method refines the selection process further by making use of a pattern 
application history that stores successful pattern applications in a certain design 
context. Each time a pattern is selected and evaluated, a designer gives feedback that 
can help to improve the precision of the following selection process for the same 
problem context. 
The security guide is intended to assist engineers in pattern selection and in 
facilitating the identification of training objectives in the second supported method, 
‘embedded security training’.   
5.2.3- Embedded Security Training  
In having a set of suggested security patterns that can potentially solve a design 




problem and educate system engineers regarding the security patterns. Our training 
method is intended to offer contextualised and personalised security training to 
improve the security knowledge of ICS developers. The training method takes a 
security pattern candidate, which is produced by the Security Guide, as input and 
provides personalised learning material by applying an automated planning 
technique.    
Effective learning was defined by Litzinger et al. as “those that support the 
development of deep understanding organized around key concepts and general 
principles, the development of skills, both technical and professional, and the 
application of knowledge and skills to problems that are representative of those faced 
by practicing engineers.” (Litzinger et al., 2011).  
The Embedded Security Training method was designed in line with the ADDIE 
model that comprises five basic steps: Analysis, Design, Development, 
Implementation, and Evaluation (Molenda, 2003). The model originated from 
Instructional Systems Development (ISD) (Wilson and Hash, 2003). ADDIE is a 
common and effective model used by training developers and instructional designers 
(Kovalchick and Dawson, 2004). The steps taken in ADDIE are recursive, as shown 
in Figure 5.3. The five basic phases of the model are Analysis, Design, Development, 








 Figure 5-3 ADDIE processes 




Table 5.1 illustrates the adaption of the ADDIE model into our security training 
method. It includes three main phases, namely training needs analysis, training plan 
design and training plan execution. 
 
Table 5-1 Security training process adapted from ADDIE model 
(source: reference (Molenda, 2003)) 
1) Training Needs Analysis - in this phase, the previous knowledge is analysed to 
identify what is to be learnt. This task is performed through knowledge 
engineering. 
2) Training Plan Design - a phase where a personalised training plan is generated 
to meet the trainees’ needs, as defined in the previous phase.   
3) Training Plan Execution – in this phase, training material is delivered to 
trainees, where they start to perform a sequence of learning activities.   
5.2.3.1- Training Material 
According to Polsani, “as individual words cannot independently produce meaning, 
the LOs in themselves are insufficient to generate significant instruction [. . .] How 
many LOs, how they are related, and for what purposes will be determined by the 
instructor’s objectives, pedagogical methodology and instructional design theories.” 
(Polsani, 2006). This indicates the necessity of using learning objects and their 
interrelations to define a learning program. Therefore, the initial step to the proposed 
security training method is to define security training objects by designing or reusing 




Training material is the learning sources that are constituted of a set of learning 
objects. Learning objects have been defined by Mavrommatis as “A Learning Object 
is a standalone, reusable, digital resource that aims at teaching one or more 
instructional objectives or concepts” (Mavrommatis, 2008).  
In this work, a set of security training topics were defined with their relations and 
dependencies in reference to security patterns. Metadata was also defined for learning 
objects for use in the knowledge engineering process. The information identified in 
the metadata set is part of the Instructional Management Systems (IMS) standards 
and specifications relevant to e-learning, and particularly to learning objects (Friesen, 
2005). Five attributes were defined for each security learning object including the 
identifier, title, learning time, relations and learning outcomes. However, this 
information is not suitable for direct use by the AI planner and needs to be translated 
into a planning model, as explained in the next section.  
5.2.3.2- Using AI automated planning in Embedded Security Training  
AI planning was defined by Garrido et al. as the “task of finding a solution within a 
search space” (Garrido et al., 2011). A plan, for a given initial state, is sequence of 
activities that achieves a set of desirable goals (Camacho et al., 2008). An automated 
planner requires two particular files that are essential to its completion of the planning 
process, planning domain and planning problem. Figure 5.4 presents a high-level 
description of the inputs and outputs of a planner.    
 
Figure 5-4 inputs and outputs of a planner  
(Adopted from reference (Garrido et al., 2011)) 
Automated planning was first used for learning in Intelligent Tutoring Systems, as 
proposed in reference (Peachey and McCalla, 1986). AI automated planning 




in significant advances in e-learning (Onaindia et al., 2007). Garrido et al. also used 
an AI planner in their proposed approach, namely myPTutor, to personalise e-
learning course design (Garrido et al., 2012). However, they are based on Case-Based 
Reasoning (CBR) in order to save predefined learning plans in a library, since 
learning plans for a course were recurrent, whereas our work is on-the-job-based 
learning and plans differ from one trainee to another.   
The planning technique was used in the security training to provide personalised 
learning throughout an adaptive training process, where training materials are 
tailored to the context of a specific problem and personal training needs. Using an 
intelligent learning system can eliminate the subjectivity of knowledge assessment 
and raise its objectivity to a higher level (Kresimir et al., 2014). The training method 
benefits from the features of an automated planner, as follows: 
• Planning domain is used to represent training objects and their relationships.  
• Planning problem is used to define individual training cases. 
• AI planner is used to generate a training plan.  
• Preconditions and effects are used to represent prerequisites and learning 
outcomes, respectively. 
A planning domain and planning problem were created through the knowledge 
engineering process to be used by an automated planner, as explained in the next 
subsections.   
5.2.3.2.1- Knowledge Engineering 
Once the metadata set of the security training material was defined, it was essential, 
in order to use the AI planning technique, to undertake a knowledge engineering task, 
namely a planning domain, by mapping training material into a planning model. A 
planning domain was created based on one of the approaches presented in reference 
(Garrido et al., 2009) that focusses on how to compile learning objects and student 
profiles into planning domains and problems. Table 5.2 illustrates how the training 
metadata was translated into a planning domain. All learning objects were mapped 
into actions and relations, and dependencies were compiled into preconditions. 




that consists of a sequence of learning objects that an engineer needs to perform to 








Table 5-2 Mapping training metadata into the planning domain 
(source: reference (Garrido et al., 2009)) 
The second task of the knowledge engineering process is the planning problem. The 
planning problem initialises the variables that represent objects, the initial state and 
the goals (Garrido et al., 2009). In the work presented in this thesis, the planning 
problem, which describes the training needs, is applied to the planning domain in 
order to generate an adaptive training plan that is tailored to a trainee’s background 
and needs.  
Table 5.3 illustrates mapping the individual training case into a planning problem. 
The object represents a trainee. The initial state represents the trainee’s prior 
knowledge, which can be retrieved from the training history. The goal represents a 




      
Table 5-3 Mapping a training case onto a planning problem 
(source: reference (Garrido et al., 2009)) 
Training metadata Planning Domain 
Learning object identifier Action 
Title of Learning object Action name 
Learning time Duration 
Relations and dependencies  Preconditions 
Learning outcomes Effects 
Tailored training plans Solution plans 
Training case Planning Problem 
Trainee Object 
Trainee’s prior knowledge Initial state 




A planning problem is modeled with every training case, whereas a planning domain 
is modeled once for the metadata of a learning object and reused by a planner within 
all training cases.  
5.2.3.2.2- Training Plan Execution 
An automated planner uses the two modelled files, the planning domain and problem, 
to generate a personalised training plan that includes a sequence of learning objects. 
Once a training plan is produced, it is executed by retrieving the corresponding 
training material and displaying it to the trainee.    
The two proposed methods for supporting developers in ICS security by design was 
integrated into the ICS-SES framework, as depicted in Figure 5.5. The framework 
was developed to support ICS developers in designing secure systems and in 
improving their security knowledge during the system design phase.  
Since our framework provides problem-based support, an external security analyser 
was used to detect a security problem in a system model. The ICS-SES framework 
supports system designers within the work environment as follows:    
• The Security Guide applies a selection method and identifies a set of 
suggested security design patterns that have the potential to solve the 
detected problem. 
• The suggested patterns are provided to a designer to choose a solution pattern 
based on the designer’s preference. 
• Once a designer chooses a pattern, the metadata of that pattern will be sent 
to the Embedded Security Training to be translated, along with the 
background of a designer, into the planning problem. 
• The AI planner applies the planning problem to the predefined planning 
domain and generates a training plan that guides the security training 
provided to an engineer. 
• When a designer selects a pattern from the list of security pattern candidates, 
the pattern is evaluated by configuring it to a system model and using a 




Our supported method is viable from two perspectives. On the one hand, guiding ICS 
developers in selecting security design patterns can improve control system security. 
Providing contextualised solutions can be more effective than general guidelines and 
standards.     
On the other hand, on-the-job security training can improve the knowledge of ICS 
developers, providing an adaptive training that is tailored to the design context and 
needs of an engineer.  Using security patterns can bridge the gap between security 
experts and control system professionals. The advantages of our framework lie in the 
utilisation of both methods together as per ‘Security Guide and Security Training’. 
 
Figure 5-5 ICS-SES Framework, ICS security by design 
5.3- System Requirements 
ICS-SES framework is proposed as an on-the-job support tool to help engineers in 
designing secure systems. Since it was designed to be used in the work environment, 
it requires integration with a system modelling tool such as Papyrus, or Enterprise 
Architect (Sparx Systems). This integration allows a designer to configure a selected 
pattern to a system model that needs to be tested as to whether it improves system 
security.  
ICS-SES also requires a security analyser to be used during the system design phase 




ICS-SES. Using an analyser also plays an important role in evaluating a selected 
security pattern, where the security of a system model is analysed and evaluated after 
pattern configuration. 
5.4- ICS-SES Architecture 
This section presents the ICS-SES architecture and articulates the functionality of 
our method in supporting ICS security engineering.   
Figure 5.6 shows the ICS-SES architecture. This work implemented the components 
colored orange, while green components, which present external tools and resources, 
were employed to complement the goals of the proposed method. 
  




5.4.1- ICS-SES Tool 
The ICS-SES Tool was implemented to integrate the two main parts of the proposed 
framework, the security guide and training. The tool is intended to be integrated into 
the development environment by providing a security guidance intervention the 
moment a security analyser identifies a security flaw in a system model. It 
implements a user interface to facilitate the interactivity. It receives its inputs from 
an external security analyser ‘9’ that is integrated into a graphical modelling tool that 
is used by a system designer to identify any security weaknesses in a system model.  
The tool provides a set of suggested security patterns to solve for any discovered 
security flaw, and allows a system designer to choose a suitable pattern. It also 
provides learning support by offering adaptive security training material in an 
interactive manner. In addition, it collects feedback after pattern evaluation through 
which it updates Case-Based Security Patterns (CBSP). 
The ICS-SES Tool communicates with all system components and plays the role of 
management tool throughout the support process. The tool can be implemented using 
any graphical programming language.  
5.4.2- Security Patterns Catalogue (SP catalogue)  
The security patterns catalogue was created by adapting two existed categories: the 
ICS-CERT category (Nelso and Chaffin, 2011) and the catalogue in reference (Motii 
et al., 2015), as discussed in Section 5.2.2.1. Figure 5.7 shows the database model 
diagram of the security pattern catalogue. 
ICS Asset: is a component or part of a system that is of value to the ICS and essential 
for performing its tasks. An asset can be hardware, communication networks, 
software, or people. In this work, ICS assets were classified into the following 
categories, as discussed in Section 5.2.2.1: 
1. Centre Controller: such as HMI and SCADA server. 
2. Field Controller: such as PLC, RTU and IED. 
3. Field Units: such as actuators, meters and sensors. 




ICS asset data table includes the attributes of an ICS asset: asset identifier, asset name 
and asset category. 
ICS Vulnerability: is a flaw in an ICS asset that constitutes a security weakness. All 
related ICS vulnerabilities were categorised, as discussed in Section 5.2.2.1, and 
saved in a Vulnerability table. ICSVulnerability contains a vulnerability identifier, 
vulnerability name, vulnerability category and an ICS asset. 
ICS Risk: is a potential attack by a threat that exploits one or more vulnerabilities 
and has a negative impact that can harm one or more assets. The table of ICSRisks 
includes a risk identifier, a risk category and the vulnerability that causes the risk. 
The risk category is linked with the asset table.  
Security Requirements: are security properties that reflect the security needs of the 
ICS system (e.g., confidentiality) in order to mitigate risks. They are used to represent 
system security objectives. Security requirements were expressed as a table of 
ICSAsset, related risks and expected security requirements. 
Abstract security patterns (ASP): encapsulate security solutions for recurring 
problems without implementation details, such as access control, authenticator and 
security logger and auditor. Abstract security patterns were classified based on ICS 
asset, ICS vulnerability and security requirements. The ASP table consists of the ICS 
asset, security requirements, and abstract security pattern.  
Concrete security patterns: are concrete implementations of security patterns. They 
are derived from abstract security patterns, and include all their aspects, plus 
additional aspects related to the specific context to enable designers to apply patterns 
to a concrete design level.  Concrete security patterns are expressed in a table of 






Figure 5-7 Security patterns catalogue data model 
For example, Figure 5-8 shows that the vulnerability of unencrypted sensitive data in 
ICS network communication carries certain security risks: 
• Spoofing 
• Tampering 
• Information disclosure 
These risks identify security requirements of:  
• Confidentiality of data 
• Integrity of data 
• Mutual authentication   
According to Fernandez et al. (Fernandez-Buglioni, 2013), the abstract security 




was identified as:  Virtual Private Network (VPN). This pattern includes two concrete 
security patterns: 
• IP Sec VPN  
• TLS VPN 
 
Figure 5-8 Security patterns catalogue data example 
5.4.3- Case-Based Security Patterns (CBSP) 
Case-Based Security Patterns (CBSP) are derived from the Case-Based Reasoning 
(CBR) technique that is used to solve problems by retrieving the most similar 
previous cases from a case base (Aamodt, 1995, Bergmann et al., 2005). CBR is a 
powerful approach for decision support and solving knowledge-based problems 
(Aamodt and Plaza, 1994). In our work, a similar technique was used to support the 
pattern selection process through reasoning by revising past cases. CBSP stores 
successful pattern selection cases and applications, including all relative information 




through a developer’s positive feedback given after evaluating a selected pattern, as 
explained in Section 5.5.    
5.4.4- User’s Profile 
All developers need to be registered in the ICS-SES system to have individual 
profiles. A developer’s profile includes an e-portfolio, security background and 
training history. Personal profiles were modelled to facilitate personalised training. 
Profiles are automatically updated during the training execution process. Once a 
trainee successfully finishes a learning object, it is added to their personal profile.   
5.4.5- Training Material 
Security training material was developed based on international standards. Security 
learning objects were defined and their interrelations were specified, as based on 
standard meta data. Learning objects were prepared for each security pattern with all 
related topics. Metadata was defined for each learning object to be translated and 
used by an AI planner.  
Figure 5.9 shows a learning object and its metadata, as defined based on the Learning 
Object Metadata standard (LOM) specified in the IEEE standards (Hodgins and 







Figure 5-9 Learning Object metadata 




Name: title given to a learning object. 
Relations: represents learning object aggregation and dependencies that define 
prerequisite knowledge levels and competency.   
Learning outcomes: the skills and knowledge that are gained upon completion of 
the learning object. 
Content: is the learning activity, e.g., text, diagrams. 
Duration: Typical time required to learn the object. 
Learning objects were translated into a planning modelling language to be used by 
an AI planner. The process of metadata translation and knowledge engineering are 
explained in the next section. 
5.4.6- Planning Domain 
Our security training method is grounded on the AI planning technique. Thus, all 
learning objects were mapped into a Planning Domain Definition Language (PDDL) 
based on reference (Garrido et al., 2009), as explained in Section 5.2.3.2.1, to be used 
by an automated planner. The training planner generates a training plan tailored to 
the personal training needs of an engineer by analysing the learning prerequisites and 
outcomes extracted from the metadata definition.  
The planning domain was modelled using a knowledge engineering tool, named 
itSimple, which is a friendly graphical interface that supports the knowledge 
engineering process (Vaquero et al., 2007). Figure 5.10 shows a screen shot of the 
tool. Since 2005, itSimple has been applied in numerous planning applications such 
as manufacturing (Vaquero et al., 2006), project management (Udo et al., 2008) and 
petroleum supply ports (Sette et al., 2008). itSimple includes a set of planners 
(Metric-FF, FF, SGPlan, MIPS-xxl, LPG-TD, LPG, hspsp, and SATPlan) that can be 
applied to a PDDL model in order to solve a planning problem.  
Using the itSimple tool adds an advantage to our method as it can translate an xml 
metadata file into the PDDL model, which allows for the reuse of available learning 




training. Hence, itSimple supports the extensibility of our embedded security training 
and facilitates the process of updating and adding new objects to our training 
repository. 
Figure 5-10 Modeling a security training planning domain using the itSimple tool 
Learning time was considered an important element of our training method as it was 
developed to take place during the system design process, ‘on-the job training’, thus 
PDDL temporal domain compilation was performed, where time is modelled by 
means of the artificial fluent total time. 
Figure 5.11. depicts an example of modeling learning objects into durative PDDL 
actions with four entries: parameters, duration, condition and effect. The learning 
object ST-LO9 consists of two sub-objects, ST-LO9-1 and ST-LO9-2. Only one 
parameter was defined for a trainee who executes the action. Duration identifies 
typical learning time. Conditions and effects vary depending on the learning object 
dependencies and relationships. A numeric function was used in order to deal with 
different levels of attainment and knowledge. Function ‘done’ uses a range of values 
[0-1], where ‘1’ means the learning object has been completed and ‘0’ means it has 
not been started. It was used to represent different competence levels, for instance, a 
value of ‘0.25’ means a trainee has learnt only 25% of the learning object. The value 




training activity. The Start predicate includes the preconditions for the action, and 
the End predicate represents its effects.  
In this example, the ‘ST-LO9-1’ and ‘ST-LO9-2’ learning objects were identified as 
a part of ‘ST-LO9’, so both objects are necessary to complete ST-LO9. ‘ST-LO9-1’ 
requires only one action, either ‘ST-LO3’ or ‘ST-LO4’, whereas, ‘ST-LO9-2’ 
requires the completion of actions ‘ST-LO9-1’ and ‘ST-LO7’. The value of the 
learning duration is calculated from sub-learning objects. For instance, the duration 
of ‘ST-LO9’ is ‘12 mins’, which is the summation of its parts’ duration.  
 
 Figure 5-11 An example of translating learning objects into durative PDDL actions 
A planning domain represents a hierarchal structure of learning activities based on 




individual needs. The planning domain was modeled for all learning objects and 
saved to be used by a training planner to generate a personalised security training 
plan.  
5.4.7- Using an AI planner to generate a training plan  
The previous section demonstrated a planning domain model for learning objects. 
This section discusses the use of an automated planner to generate a training plan by 
modelling a planning problem and solving it through the compilation of a planning 
domain and problem.    
A planning problem needs to be generated interactively during ICS-SES tool 
utilisation for each training case. A training case considers a selected security pattern, 
trainee profile and background. This information is mapped into problem model 
propositions including those of objects, initial state, and goal state. The object 
represents a trainee. The initial state represents the trainee’s profile and background, 
including the attained values explained in the previous section. The goal is to attain 
the learning object of the security pattern selected by a trainee to solve a security 
weakness detected in a system model.  
Figure 5.12 shows a part of the learning objects hierarchy that was modelled into a 
planning domain. The figure depicts an example of a training case, which includes 
the trainee’s background and needs, using different colours. The blue rectangles 
illustrate the learned objects whilst the red rectangle presents the target training 
object that had been identified based on the selected security pattern through the 





Figure 5-12 A part of the learning objects’ hierarchy, relationships, and dependencies  
Figure 5.13 shows the corresponding planning problem model of the training case 
described above. Data was retrieved from a trainee’s profile and translated into a 
planning problem by PDDL translator ‘8’ shown in Figure 5-6. Once an appropriate 
planning problem was generated, a planner applied it to the predefined planning 
domain to generate a personalised training plan. The training plan consists of a 
sequence of learning objects that are executed by a trainee. 
 Figure 5-13 An example of a planning problem model 
According to the example shown in Figure 5.11, there is more than one possible plan 
for the given problem as based on the trainee’s background. However, the training 
planner choses the shortest plan, as based on the learning duration identified in the 
planning domain, to maintain efficiency. For instance, three different plans can be 

















Table 5-4 An example of training plans 
Figure 5.14. shows that the training planner generated the shortest plan, ‘A’. The 
training plan is sent to the ICS-SES tool, which then retrieves the corresponding 
training activities from the training material repository and delivers them to the 
trainee.    
Plan A= {ST-LO7, ST-LO9-2, ST-LO6-2, ST-LO23, ST-LO13-1, ST-LO13-2} 
Plan A consists of six learning objects, required time = 1+1+1+2+1+1= 7 mins. 
Plan B= {ST-LO14, ST-LO10-1, ST-LO10-2, ST-LO6-2, ST-LO23, ST-LO13-
1, ST-LO13-2} 
Plan B consists of seven learning objects, required time = 2+1+1+1+2+1+1= 9 
mins. 
Plan C= {ST-LO32, ST-LO33, ST-LO23, ST-LO13-1, ST-LO13-2} 




Figure 5-14 A training plan generated by a planner 
ICS-SES architecture, shown in Figure 5.6, collaborates with external resources 
including those of ICS-CERT and security experts. The ICS-CERT database extends 
our security pattern catalogue by identifying new vulnerabilities, as was discussed in 
Section 5.2.2.1. Security experts extend our repository of security patterns by 
developing new security solutions in the form of security patterns.   
5.5- ICS-SES workflow   
Our security support flow is demonstrated in Figure 5.15. As mentioned previously, 
ICS developers need to be registered with the ICS-SES system in order to have 
individual profiles. The figure shows that a logged developer starts using the ICS-
SES system after detecting a security problem after scanning a system model during 
the system design phase. If a developer decides to use the ICS-SES tool, the security 
guide helps to solve the problem by performing the four pattern selection steps 




developer chooses one of the patterns, the security training tool generates an adaptive 
training plan through the three learning phases discussed in Section 5.4 that is tailored 
to the selected pattern and the developer’s needs. After each training object 
execution, the training planner generates a new plan, based on the last update of a 
developer’s background, in order to improve the efficiency of the training plan. When 
a training goal is obtained, which means learning the selected security pattern, a 
developer configures the selected pattern to a system model using a modelling tool 
and evaluates it using a security scanner. Then, the developer is asked to give 
feedback as to whether the pattern solves the problem that was discovered. Positive 
feedback is stored in CBSP, as introduced in Section 5.4.3, and used as a 
recommendation in the next pattern selection process that shows the same problem 
context. The entire support flaw keeps recurring until the problem is solved or a 
developer chooses to exit.  
 






This chapter has presented a novel framework, named ICS-SES, that can be used to 
support developers in the design of secure control systems. The ICS-SES framework 
focuses on two support dimensions, technical and learning, to assist engineers in 
developing ICS security by design within their work environment.  
The framework combines two new support methods, namely a pattern-based security 
guide, which guides pattern selection to solve a design security problem, and 
embedded security training, which provides security training material tailored to the 
problem context and the personal training needs of a system designer.  
The chapter initially presented the approaches and techniques that motivated the 
design of our particular framework. Then, the two main methods underpinning the 
ICS-SES framework were explained and system requirements were outlined, 
followed by demonstrating the ICS-SES architecture and discussing its components. 
Lastly, the entire ICS-SES workflow was explained with a demonstrative flowchart. 
The feasibility of the ICS-SES framework needs to be tested by showing that it can 
support engineers in the design of secure systems and in improving their security 
knowledge. The next chapter introduces the ICS-SES prototyping tool and discusses 







A Controlled Experiment for Evaluating ICS-SES 
 
Chapter objectives 
• To introduce the controlled experiment method to evaluate ICS-SES. 
• To outline the purpose of the experiment 
• To demonstrate the experiment design and procedure 
• To discuss the preliminary results of the experiment 
• To illustrate the experimental execution 
 
6.1- Introduction 
Following Chapter 5, which introduced a supported method, namely ICS-SES, to 
assist developers in designing secure control systems, this chapter uses a prototyping 
tool for ICS-SES to empirically evaluate its usability and effectiveness in supporting 
ICS security by design. Before carrying out the evaluation of ICS-SES, it was 
necessary to clearly identify the evaluation methodology. A controlled experiment, 
which is one of the evaluation methods used in design science research, was chosen 
to evaluate the qualities of our artefact ‘ICS-SES’. The selection of this method was 
discussed and justified in Chapter 3, Section 3.4.4.  
Using a controlled experiment methodology allowed the researcher to conduct a 
focus study that produced statistically significant results. It helped her to emphasise 
specific variables and measure the relationships among them. It was useful in 
formulating the study hypotheses through the clear definition of the questions being 
studied throughout the experiment. Such an evaluation method usually results in 
well-defined dependent and independent variables and well-defined hypotheses 
(Basili, 2007). A controlled experiment procedure was designed and underwent 
preliminarily testing before executing the main evaluation study to ensure the 
viability of the procedure. 
The chapter is divided into the following sections. Section 6.2 highlights the purpose 
of the experiment. Section 6.3 discusses the experimental design, demonstrating the 
variables, materials, tasks and participants. Section 6.4 explains the experimental 




consequent changes. Section 6.6 demonstrates the study execution. Section 6.7 gives 
a summary of the chapter.  
6.2- The Purpose of the Experiment 
An experiment was designed to evaluate whether the ICS-SES tool can help 
engineers to develop ICS security by design and improve their security knowledge. 
The main objective of the experiment was to ascertain the usefulness and 
effectiveness of the security guidance and learning provided by the ICS-SES tool, 
and to check whether using the tool can help engineers to design secure control 
systems. The focus of the experiment was on the use of the ICS-SES tool to provide 
pattern-based solutions and tailored learning materials to solve a particular security 
problem in a system model. Therefore, the experimental evaluation of the ICS-SES 
tool was carried out to test the following hypotheses:  
H1- Effectiveness (Performance): Participants will be better able to solve any 
security problem(s) in a system model with the help of the ICS-SES tool.  
H2- Effectiveness (understanding the problem): Participants will better understand 
the security problem(s) with the support of the ICS-SES tool. 
H3- Effectiveness (understanding the solution): Participants will better understand 
the security solution(s) with the help of the ICS-SES tool. 
H4- Ease of task (ease of solving the problem): The difficulty in solving the 
security problem will be reduced with the help of the ICS-SES tool. 
H5- Efficiency (Time): The time taken to solve the security problem, given in the 
scenario, will be reduced when using the ICS-SES tool. 
The above will be in addition to the qualitative data obtained from participants’ 
feedback. 
6.3- Experiment Design 
The experiment was designed based on the practical methodological guidance 
provided by Koet.al. in the evaluation of software engineering tools with human 




research question “Can a supported tool assist developers in designing secure 
control systems?”.   
There was only one treatment of the ‘ICS-SES tool’ used in the experimental design. 
The comparison study was between an experimental group, named the supported 
group, who used the ICS-SES tool and another, named the plain group, who used a 
conventional development environment that was replicated by a graphical tool, the 
‘Plain tool’. The key property of the experiment was that both groups received the 
exact same materials including tutorials, problem scenario, tasks, instructions, IDE 
and experimental environment; for the only difference was that our supported tool 
was only provided to one experimental group to identify whether there was any 
difference in the outcomes of the two groups. 
6.3.1- Ethical Approval 
As the experiment involves human participants, it was essential to secure an ethical 
approval application before conducting this study to ensure that it adhered to British 
Psychological Society (BPS) ethical guidelines. The ethical approval for the 
experiment was granted by the Faculty Research Ethics Committee (FREC) 
(ref:1415/247-1) (Appendix B-2). It covered issues related to respect of participants; 
confidentiality of the collected data and identity of participants; standard of self-
determination, so participants can withdraw partially or completely from the 
experiment at any time and without explanation; and honesty and accuracy when 
representing the collected data. 
6.3.2- Experiment Variables 
6.3.2.1- Independent Variable 
The ICS Security Engineering Support (ICS-SES) tool, which is a prototyping tool, 
was developed and used in the experiment, and is introduced in Section 6.3.3.1.  
6.3.2.2- Dependent Variables 
The experiment focused on determining whether participants could use the ICS-SES 




security skills. In particular, the tool’s usability was evaluated in terms of the 
effectiveness, efficiency, learning outcomes and ease of the task compared to the 
conventional development environment that was replicated by using the ‘Plain tool’, 
as presented in Section 6.3.3.2. 
Performance, the performance of the participants in solving the problem is reported 
and measured to assess the effectiveness of the tool in supporting the participants in 
designing secure systems. 
Learning outcomes, the understanding of the problem and the solution were 
measured pre- and post-experimental task to evaluate the effectiveness of our tool in 
improving participants’ knowledge.   
Time, the time spent to complete the task of solving the problem is reported and 
measured to evaluate the efficiency of our tool. A time evaluation was considered 
due to the nature of our tool, as it is intended to be used within the workplace, where 
time is a significant issue.  
Participants’ feedback, which was obtained from the post-questionnaires, is 
measured to evaluate the ease of performing the experiment task. 
6.3.2.3- Controlled Variables 
Participants, the participants were undergraduate and postgraduate students from De 
Montfort University, Leicester, UK. The selection and size of the sample is discussed 
and justified in Section 6.3.6.   
Tasks, the experiment session lasted for a maximum of one hour. Participants were 
required to solve a security problem in a system model using either the ICS-SES tool 
or Plain tool and complete a pre-questionnaire and post-questionnaire.  
6.3.2.4- Extraneous Variables 
Experience with security patterns and ICS security were defined as extraneous 
variables in this experiment. Engineers who have security experience will have an 




ICS-SES tool. Hence, engineers with security experience were excluded from the 
experiment.   
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6.3.3.1- ICS-SES Tool 
Having developed the proposed supported framework, which was introduced in the 
last chapter, it was necessary to further develop a prototyping tool to evaluate this 
framework. The prototype, which was  initially proposed in the early 1970s, typically 
simulates certain aspects of the final system or product (Grimm, 2004).  In this work, 
the ICS-SES tool was developed to evaluate the feasibility of our supported 
framework.  
The ICS-SES tool was implemented as a Java application based on the ICS-SES 
architecture, as presented in Chapter 5, Section 5.4. ICS-SES components were 
implemented using Eclipse, MySQL for database management, and the itSimple tool 
for knowledge engineering and planning.  
The tool was built to provide a graphical user interface with emphasis on two main 
functionalities: first, the is tool intended to guide users in selecting security patterns 
that solve a security problem; the second was to provide personalised training 
material related to the security problem and tailored to the user’s background. 
Pattern-based security guide - the selection method, which was demonstrated in 
Chapter 5, Section 5.2.2, was implemented to extract a set of secure design pattern 
candidates from the security patterns catalogue based on the security problem in a 
system model. For example, Figure 6.1 shows the ICS-SES Tool providing a set of 
suggestions to mitigate an unauthorised access vulnerability. The tool allows users 
to choose one of the pattern candidates and depicts the corresponding changes in the 
system model before confirming their modifications. Based on our selection method, 
authorisation was identified as an abstract security pattern candidate that includes 
four concrete patterns: Access Matrix, Multilevel Security, Role-Based Access 
Control (RBAC), and Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC). Concrete patterns 




to their preference. Figure 6.2 shows that how RBAC pattern would be configured to 
‘Siter1PLC’ in the system model and the tool allows users to confirm these changes.    
Figure 6-1 ICS-SES tool provides a set of pattern candidates to solve the security problem  
Figure 6-2 ICS-SES tool displays the corresponding changes in the system model after selecting 




As discussed regarding ICS-SES architecture, Chapter 5, Section 5.4, our method 
used an external security analyser to identify security weaknesses in a system model, 
which was then used as an input to the ICS-SES tool. The analyser developed by 
(Lemaire et al., 2015) was chosen for several reasons: first, the analyzer was 
developed as a plugin integrated into the Papyrus modelling tool to be used at the 
design stage. Second, it is based on analysing a control system that was modelled in 
SysML, which is commonly used to develop ICS, by parsing the model into 
Imperative Declarative Programming (IDP) and using logic theory to extract 
vulnerabilities. Third, the knowledge-base that was used in the analyser is inherited 
from the ICS-CERT database used by our tool. However, the analyser is still under 
development, and cannot automatically translate a system model into the IDP file to 
be analysed. Any changes in the system model need to be written immediately into 
the IDP file to be considered in the analysis process. Therefore, it was not possible 
to use the analyser in our experiment, as system engineers are not familiar with IDP, 
and providing IDP training is outside our scope, and more practically would make 
the experimental time significantly longer.  
On the other hand, there was a need to evaluate the security pattern that was suggested 
by our tool and chosen by a participant. In order to overcome this challenge and 
prepare an experimental environment that replicates how our tool would work in a 
real-world environment. The scenario of a system model that had a security flaw was 
prepared, and showed the report produced by the analyser to participants through our 
tool. All cases of the patterns’ configuration were prepared and saved in the ICS-SES 
tool, which displays them according to the user selection. The solution was also 
defined to assess the pattern selection. When a participant chooses a pattern from a 
set of pattern candidates, the ICS-SES tool discovers whether that pattern actually 
solves the problem by comparing it with the pre-defined solution and then providing 
a suitable message, as shown in Figure 6.3 and Figure 6.4.   
Figure 6.3 shows that the pattern chosen by an engineer did not solve the problem, 
as the analyser is still giving the same result for the problem. This means the engineer 




Figure 6-3 Result from the security analyser shows a security problem 
Figure 6.4 shows that the pattern chosen by an engineer solved the security problem 
as the analyser no longer detects the problem after pattern configuration. The 
message asks to notify the experiment conductor for efficiency evaluation, as 







Figure 6-4 The message notifying the selection of a suitable security pattern 
Tailored security training- is the second main functionality provided by the ICS-
SES tool that implements the training method, as demonstrated in Chapter 5, Section 
5.2.3, to provide security training material tailored to the personal needs of the tool 




selected pattern and the prior knowledge of the user. The ICS-SES tool offers the 
security training material that had been specially prepared by the researcher based on 
online training resources such as ICS-CERT and NIST. Each learning object was 
presented on a page in the Google site to facilitate training tracking using Google 
Analytics, as discussed in the next chapter. Figure 6.5 shows some examples of 
training material related to the Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) pattern.  
In our training method, the training needs assessment is typically based on data 
retrieved from a trainee’s profile. However, using the question/answer method can 
uncover any knowledge that has been gained informally such as through self-learning 
and informal discussion. It was sufficient for our prototype to use question/answers 
to check a trainee’s understanding of a topic because of the need for a reasonable 
number of participants and as the nature of the study meant that suitably diverse 




Figure 6-5 Training material for Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) pattern 
When a participant chooses a security pattern from the list of patterns suggested by 
our tool, questions are asked regarding every related learning object in order to assess 
the user’s prior knowledge and accordingly provide personalized training, as shown 
in Figure 6.6. Participants have the option to rate their knowledge, or let the tool test 
their knowledge, by asking some related questions to determine the user’s level of 




tool assessment, with the tool providing tailored training material. This process is 
iterative for all training topics related to the selected security pattern.   
 
 Figure 6-6 The tool test for training needs assessment 
In the case of self-rating, the knowledge rate is divided into four main levels: novice 
(0-25%), intermediate (26-50%), advanced (51-75%) and expert (76-100%). 
Accordingly, the tool determines the amount of information that is required for any 
given user. The tool offers the whole topic to novice users, an overview for 




for advanced users, and no information for experts. However, all users have the 
option of extending the training material to more detailed information.  
If users choose to be tested by the tool, they would be asked a number of questions 
about each sub-topic. Users’ answers were used as the basis for the training planning 
loop, where the information for the corresponding sub-topic is shown when users get 
any given question wrong.   
6.3.3.2- Plain Tool 
A graphical tool, named the ‘Plain tool’, was developed so the control group, the 
‘Plain group’ would have the same working environment as the experimental group. 
The Plain tool allows participants to choose a solution pattern for any security 
weakness identified in the system model. It also allows them to see the corresponding 
changes after pattern configuration and check whether the vulnerability has been 
mitigated. The tool provides exactly the same development environment as the ICS-
SES tool except for the associated security guidance and training. Figure 6.7 shows 
a screenshot of the Plain tool. The tool allows the user to choose a solution from a 
security pattern catalogue and evaluate it, though without the support of our ICS-SES 
tool. The tool was developed to simulate the real development environment where 





Figure 6-7 The Plain tool, as developed for the control group 
6.3.3.3- Pre-Questionnaire 
A pre-questionnaire was designed in order to understand how engineers currently 
design control systems in terms of security engineering, and to know about their 
security training history. It started with an identifying participant reference, which 
was a unique code provided by the researcher, that linked individual responses for 
the pre- and post-experiment questionnaires for comparison purposes. The 





Section-A- Security Background 
This section aimed to identify participants’ backgrounds and their awareness of ICS 
vulnerabilities, security patterns and guidelines, and their role in developing secure 
systems. This section helped to understand the relation between what participants 
think about their level of security knowledge and their actual performance in solving 
a given security problem.  
Section-B- Security Training 
The section aimed to identify participants’ security training histories to determine 
whether participants had security experience, as this was used to filter participants. 
Participants who had good security knowledge were excluded from the experiment.  
Section-C- User Motivation 
This section was designed to discover engineers’ motivations regarding the 
construction of secure systems and improving their security skills. The section also 
helped to understand what may increase and decrease their satisfaction when using 
our tool.    
Section-D- Pre-test 
This section was designed to objectively test participants in terms of information 
security. The purpose of the pre-test was to ascertain whether participants had any 
pre-existing knowledge related to the security problem given in the scenario. The 
pre-test and post-test method is widely used for comparing groups or measuring the 
effectiveness of experimental treatment (Dimitrov and Rumrill Jr, 2003). The section 
involved two multi-choice questions to allow the assessment of participants’ 
backgrounds regarding the two main aspects of the security problem and its solution. 
The result of the pre-test was compared with that of the post-test, which included the 
post-experiment questionnaire, to assess the outcomes of using the ICS-SES tool. 
6.3.3.4- Post-Questionnaire 
Two different versions of the post-questionnaire were designed for the two groups of 




participants’ experiences in terms of solving the given security problem. Data 
collected from two groups was compared to test the hypotheses defined in Section 
6.2. Participants were also asked to use the same references that were used in the pre-
questionnaire to determine individual performances and changes. 
Post-questionnaire (A) for Supported group 
This questionnaire was developed for the group using the ICS-SES tool to collect 
information about their experiences and identify the usability of the tool. It was 
divided into four sections, as shown in Appendix D-2.    
Section-A- Participants’ Experiences  
This section was aimed at collecting information about participants’ performances in 
the task of solving the security problem given in the system model, and identifying 
their experiences in solving it, and in understanding the problem and its solution.  
Section-B- Usability Evaluation Framework Cognitive Dimensions (CD) of the 
ICS-SES Tool 
This section was designed as based on the Cognitive Dimensions (CD) framework. 
CD is an analytical theoretical framework for usability evaluation (Green and Petre, 
1996). The validity and reliability of this technique has been assessed by a number 
of researchers (Kutar et al., 2002) (Triffitt and Khazaei, 2002) (Blackwell and Green, 
2000). For our study, six dimensions were used to evaluate the usability of the ICS-
SES tool including visibility, difficult mental operations, diffuseness, closeness of 
mapping, consistency and role expressiveness.  
 Section-C- Usefulness and Satisfaction 
This section was created based on a Usefulness, Satisfaction and Ease of use (USE) 
questionnaire (Lund, 2001). Participants were asked about the usefulness of our tool 
in support of security engineering. The questions were asked to determine whether 
participants were satisfied with the levels of support offered by the tool. In addition, 
open questions were asked to collect suggestions and recommendations for 







The post-test was created with the same questions as the pre-test. The purpose of the 
post-test was to assess the knowledge improvement in the context of the given 
security problem. The answers from both tests were compared to determine the effect 
of using our tool. 
Post-questionnaire (B) for Plain group 
A different post-questionnaire was developed for the control group, who did not use 
our tool. The questionnaire was designed to collect information about participants’ 
experiences on securing a system model by solving the given security problem. The 
questions were structured into four sections, as shown in Appendix D-3. 
Section A: Participants’ experiences 
This section was designed to collect information about participants’ experiences 
regarding the task of solving the security problem. It was aimed at determining 
whether they could solve the problem without the support of our tool. The section 
was also aimed at determining if there were any supportive resources that helped 
participants to perform the task of securing the system model. Data collected in this 
section was compared with section-A in post-questionnaire (A). 
Section B: Difficulties 
In this section, participants were asked a number of questions about the task load to 
understand the difficulties in solving the problem without the support of our tool. 
Section C: Support Needs 
This section was created to identify the further support required for developing ICS 
security by design in line with the previous finding of the needs assessment study 
presented in Chapter 4.  
Section D: Post-test 
Participants from both groups were asked the same questions in order to evaluate the 






A tutorial was prepared to demonstrate the scenario of a control system that included 
a security weakness, as presented in Appendix D-4. Participants from both the 
experiment group and control group attended the same tutorial session to ensure that 
they received the same information background regarding the scenario. In addition, 
the last section of the tutorial introduced and demonstrated the ICS-SES tool to the 
Supported group.   
6.3.4- The Problem Scenario  
A scenario of a system model, which has a security flaw, was given to participants to 
compare how they solved the problem with and without the use of our tool.  The 
scenario description is given in Appendix D. It includes a control system description 
with its SYSML model and the result of security analyser, which highlights a security 
problem in the model. The scenario was explained and clarified throughout the 
experimental session.  
6.3.5- Experiment Task 
This research focusses on supporting engineers in designing secure control systems 
through guiding them as to the selection of a suitable security solution and improving 
their security knowledge. Therefore, the main task of the evaluation experiment was 
to identify a suitable security pattern that mitigated the security vulnerability given 
in the scenario.  
In the Supported group, participants were asked to solve the problem with the help 
of the ICS-SES tool. They had to choose a solution and evaluate it using our tool. 
The Plain group were provided a list of all security patterns through the Plain tool. 
Participants from the latter group had to solve the problem without the help of our 
tool. However, they could use any other materials they wanted to help them perform 
the task. A 30 minute time frame was specified to perform the experimental task 






Participants were invited to participate in the experiment based on our inclusion 
criteria. All engineers involved in the ICS development process were identified as 
potential participants, such as control engineers, control system designers and 
embedded system engineers.  Engineering students were a representative sample of 
the ICS-SES tool’s intended users. According to the guideline developed by Ko et 
al., “students can be appropriate participants when their knowledge, skills, and 
experiences fit within a tool’s intended user population” (Ko et al., 2015). In the 
survey reported by (Sjøberg et al., 2005), it was found that students had been 
recruited for 91 controlled experiments in software engineering.   
The experiment used 79 participants in the faculty of Technology at De Montfort 
University, Leicester, UK. The participants had different levels of education 
(undergraduates, postgraduates and lecturers). They were randomly assigned to the 
treatment groups, leading to 40 in the Supported group and 39 in the Plain group. 
The sample size was suitable for evaluating our framework for several reasons: (1) 
any noise and variation between the experimental groups were minimised by 
conducting the experiment at the same time in the same environment using the same 
material, and providing the same development environment except for the use, or 
otherwise, of the ICS-SES tool. The less variation within an experiment, the fewer 
participants one needs (Ko et al., 2015). (2) a significant difference can be seen across 
a small group of participants in each experimental group; for example, the study 
conducted by (LaToza and Myers, 2011) achieved significant differences with just 
six respondents per group. (3) according to the review of the 92 controlled 
experiments reported by Dybå et al, such a sample size is widely accepted in software 
engineering (Dybå et al., 2006). Their results showed that the average sample size 
average is 34 per group.  
In addition, the sample size was calculated based on the formula reported by (Allen 
Jr, 2011) using the SPSS software suite. Since there was no historical data from 
similar studies available, the effect of size was determined using the two pilot 
samples’ means from the results of our preliminary study. The calculation resulted in 




6.4- Experiment Procedure 
The experiment procedure was developed based the methods of (Ko et al., 2015) The 
experimental session was designed to cover the five parts presented in Figure 6.8. 
Before participants begin the experiment, they were given an informed consent form, 
which provides a brief explanation of our research and the purpose of the 
experimental study in order to allow them to decide whether they wanted to 
participate, as shown in Appendix B-4. The informed consent was approved through 
the ethics approval process for this study.  
The group assignment was done randomly to distribute the random variation in 
respondents’ security backgrounds across the two groups. Random assignment to 
experimental conditions is widely used in controlled studies to ensure that differences 
in the groups’ performance is due to any differences in conditions or tools being 
compared, rather than differences between participants (Ko et al., 2015). 
A tutorial about the scenario was given to both groups. At the end of the tutorial, the 
ICS-SES tool was introduced to the experiment group. Then, participants were 
invited to complete the pre-questionnaire. Once all participants had done so, they 
were asked to solve the security problem using either the ICS-SES tool or the Plain 
tool as based on the group they had been [randomly] assigned to. When a participant 
successfully solved the problem or the time allocated to the task expired, they were 
invited to complete the appropriate post-questionnaire (again, as based on the group 





 Figure 6-8 The experimental procedure 
6.5- Preliminary study 
A preliminary study was conducted to test the viability of the experimental procedure 
and to estimate the time required to complete the experimental session. Eleven 
engineers voluntarily participated in the experiment. They were randomly assigned 
to two groups. The Supported group included six participants, one lecturer, four 
postgraduates and one undergraduate student. The Plain group had five participants, 
one lecturer, three postgraduates and one undergraduate students.    
The experiment was conducted in a computer laboratory in the Faculty of 
Technology at De Montfort University. Participants went through the whole 
experimental procedure, including the tutorial, pre-questionnaire, experiment task 
and post-questionnaire. All participants completed the session within one hour. 
6.5.1. Preliminary Results 
The initial results helped the researcher to calculate the required sample size for the 
main controlled experiment, as explained in Section 6.3.6. Participants’ feedback 




as improving the experimental design before conducting the main evaluation 
experiment.  
The feedback collected showed that the questions in the pre-test and post-test were 
too specific. Therefore, they were changed to be more general and assess the 
understanding of the problem and the security solution, including a scenario of a 
security problem that was similar to the one given in the experimental task (see 
Appendix D).  
The ICS-SES tool was also improved based on the feedback of the Supported group. 
Participants’ feedback showed that some topics in the training material are complex, 
and some terminologies were hard to understand. Thus, the training content was 
simplified and any related terminology was defined. In addition, participants 
commented about the task load of using the tool, as users had to select a security 
pattern and browse the related training material. Therefore, offering the training 
material was changed so as to be optional.      
Regarding the experiment material, participants were able to understand the 
experiment instructions, system scenario and the questions in both questionnaires.  
6.6- Experiment Execution 
The main experiment was conducted in the computer laboratory in the Faculty of 
Technology at de Montfort University. Participants were randomly assigned to two 
groups, as shown in Table 6.1. The Supported group had forty participants (twenty-
five undergraduate and fifteen postgraduate students). The Plain group had thirty-
nine participants (twenty-four undergraduate and fifteen postgraduate students).  
Participants Supported group Plain group Total 
Undergraduate 25 24 49 
Postgraduate 15 15 30 
Total 40 39 79 
Table 6-1 Participants in the experiment groups 
Initially, the researcher presented a familiarisation tutorial about the system scenario 
and explained the instructions to the experimental process. There was a section in the 




participants were given as much time as they required to ask questions and clarify 
the scenario. 
When all participants in both groups had completed the pre-questionnaire, they were 
asked to start the task of solving the security problem in the scenario using either the 
ICS-SES tool or the Plain tool, as based on their assigned group. The Plain group 
was allowed to use any online materials they liked to help them solve the problem. 
The time for task completion was limited to half an hour. However, participants were 
asked to inform the conductor when they successfully solved the problem to record 
the time. Finally, participants completed the post-questionnaires based on their 
assigned group and were informally asked to give their feedback and attitude toward 
the ICS-SES tool, where appropriate.  
The data collected was analysed based on its type, categorical or numerical, as 
presented and discussed in Chapter 7. 
6.7- Conclusion 
This chapter presented an empirical study design that was used to assess the usability 
of the ICS-SES educational tool in terms of effectiveness, efficiency and ease of task 
in assisting engineers to develop ICS security by design.  The controlled experiment 
was designed to test five hypotheses, as outlined in Section 6.2, based on the 
guidelines developed by (Ko et al., 2015) in line with the research question. The 
experimental design included one treatment with two conditions: an experimental 
group, ‘Supported’, that used our tool, ‘ICS-SES’, and a control group, ‘Plain’, that 
did not use our tool. In this experiment, the task of solving a security problem in a 
system model using the ICS-SES tool support was evaluated in comparison to the 
traditional development environment simulated by the Plain tool. 
Experimental materials were prepared to present the task scenario and data collection 
instruments, in addition to a familiarisation tutorial to demonstrate the scenario and 
introduce the ICS-SES tool to the experimental group.  
In this chapter, the experiment procedure was explained and the sample size was 
discussed and justified. Despite the applicability of the experiment procedure, as 




opportunities for further enhancements. Accordingly, any required changes were 
implemented and the experimental design was improved. 
In the next chapter, the data collected will be analysed and the results presented and 







ICS-SES Evaluation  
 
Chapter objectives 
• To introduce the evaluation of the ICS-SES framework 
• To present data analysis and results 
• To discuss the internal and external threats to validity 
• To discuss the findings 
 
7.1. Introduction  
This chapter presents the results of the controlled experiment, which was 
demonstrated in the last chapter, to evaluate our supported framework, ‘ICS-SES’. 
Data was collected from the pre-questionnaire, post-questionnaire and the record of 
participants’ performances that included task completion and duration.  
The collected data was analysed using the SPSS software (SPSS, 2013) using various 
analytical techniques, according to data type, in line with the purpose of this study as 
outlined in Chapter 6, Section 6.2. Cross-tabulation analysis and Chi-Squared 
statistics were used to test this research hypothesis regarding data comparison of 
participant performance, learning and the ease of task. The numerical data, which 
was collected from the task completion time record, was analysed by calculating the 
mean total time for each experimental group, and the two group results were 
compared using independent two-sample t-test analysis to test our hypothesis 
regarding efficiency. The subjective feedback was analysed based on the cognitive 
dimension framework. In addition, the Google Analytics tool was used to analyse 
participants’ behaviour and engagement with the provided training.  
The chapter is divided into the following sections. Section 7.2 presents the results of 
the evaluation experiment in relation to the dependent variables. Section 7.3 presents 




overall users’ experiences. Section 7.4 presents the results of participants’ 
engagement with the security training. Section 7.5 illustrates the Plain group’s 
experience. Section 7.6 highlights the internal and external threats. Section 7.7 
discusses the experimental results in relation to the study hypotheses. Section 7.8 
summarises the chapter.  
7.2. Results  
A dataset with 79 responses collected from the pre-questionnaire, 79 responses from 
the post-questionnaire and 79 responses from participants’ performance record was 
produced. The data was entered into the SPSS software suite to be analysed using a 
number of analytical techniques.  
The results are presented and grouped according to the objectives of our research.    
7.2.1. Participants’ Prior knowledge  
7.2.1.1. ICS Security Problems 
“How do you rate your knowledge about common security problems in industrial 
control systems?” 
The result shows that a large proportion of the responses (74%) rated their ICS 
security issues knowledge as being at a poor, or very poor, level. A small proportion 
(18%) of the respondents rated their knowledge as average, while only 8% reported 
that their understanding of ICS security is good. None of the participants rated their 
knowledge as an excellent, as shown in Figure 7.1. The results clearly show that 
engineers lack knowledge of ICS security problems. Our automated tailored training 





Figure 7-1 Participants’ knowledge on ICS security problems 
7.2.1.2. Security Standards and Guidelines 
“How do you rate your knowledge about security standards and guidelines for 
industrial control system design?” 
Figure 7.2 shows that 81% of participants rated their knowledge of ICS security 
standards as being at a poor, or very poor, level, whereas a small minority (13%) 
reported their background as being average. The remaining minority (6%) claimed a 
good level of knowledge. None of the responses rated themselves as having an 
excellent level of knowledge. The results illustrate that engineers lack knowledge of 
security standards and best practise.  
 
Figure 7-2 Participants’ knowledge on ICS security standards 
 

















In terms of investigating security awareness, Figure 7.3 presents the results of 
participants’ awareness of the common institutions and teams that publish ICS 
security guidelines and recommendations. The bar chart below shows that almost all 
participants had not heard about those publishers, with 13% of participants having 
heard about them but not used them. The responses show that NIST has been used 
by 1.4% of the participants, followed by 0.3% who have used SANS and 0.2% who 
have used NISA.  The results demonstrate that ICS developers are not aware of 
common security guidelines’ resources, therefore the tool should be useful in 
providing a repository of knowledge that engineers can easily access. 
 
Figure 7-3 Participants’ awareness of common security guideline publishers 
7.2.1.3. Security Engineering Awareness and Responsibility 
“Are you responsible for the security in the control system development?” 
Figure 7.4 presents the responses for participants’ awareness of the need to consider 
security early in the system development cycle. Just over a half (53%) of participants 
stated that they are not responsible for secure control systems, whereas 42% reported 
that they share the role of security engineering. Only 5% of the participants claimed 
full responsibility for building secure systems. The results show that control system 
engineers are not aware of their responsibilities for developing secure systems. As 
the ICS-SES tool is integrated into everyday work, it should be useful in supporting 





Figure 7-4 Participants’ awareness of the security engineering responsibility 
“When you design a control system, do you take security requirements into            
consideration?”  
Similarly, regarding security engineering, these responses articulate the lack of 
security consideration during the system design phase. A significant majority (83%) 
of the participants have never considered system security during development cycle. 
10% rarely take the security requirements into account. 5% of responses showed 
some security consideration whilst an almost insignificant number (2%) of 
participants declared that they always consider security during system design, as 
shown in Figure 7.5. The results demonstrate that control system development 
process lack security requirements consideration. Therefore, the ICS-SES tool would 
bring security into process.   
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 “At which phase of control system development cycle security should be 
considered?”  
The pie chart below presents the responses for the awareness of considering security 
throughout the system lifecycle. In contrast to the previous result, almost half of 
participants (48%) stated that security should be considered at all system 
development phases. A small minority (17%) stated that security should be 
considered at the design phase, with the remainder reporting consideration at the 
operation and building phase, in the proportions of 13% and 6%, respectively. 16% 
of participants did not know at which phase security should be considered, as shown 
in Figure 7.6. The results show that engineers lack security awareness, therefore our 
educational tool should be useful in increasing engineers’ security awareness.   
 
Figure 7-6 Responses as to the phase at which system development should involve security 
considerations 
To sum up, the previous results were grouped together because they demonstrate the 
participants’ current awareness and knowledge. The results have shown that the level 
of understanding amongst control system engineers is not what is needed to produce 








At which phase of control system development cycle security should be 
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7.2.2. Security Training  
 “Have you had any training on control system security before?”  
Almost all participants (95%) have not had any security training, as shown in Figure 
7.7. Only four participants out of 79 had training courses and it was more than five 
years ago, 3 of them had security courses as a part of their education and one at work 
place. The results clearly demonstrate that control system developers lack security 
training support, our tool should be useful as it provides on-the-job training support. 
 
Figure 7-7 Participants’ responses to attending previous security training 
 
7.2.3. Engineers’ Motivation 
“When a security weakness is discovered during system development, what does 
describe your most common action?” 
Figure 7.8 shows that, a significant majority of participants (74%) expressed an 
interest in learning about security problems and how to solve them. Approximately 
a quarter of the participants (24%) would pass the problem to different team. Only 
one participant expressed a complete disregard for the security problem. The results 











Figure 7-8 Participants’ reaction of finding a security problem during system development 
“In terms of learning new skills, what is your preferred training method?” 
In terms of investigating the motivation of the participants, they were asked to 
identify the preferred training method. The responses showed that more than half 
(58%) preferred to learn during their work, while a quarter (25%) liked to learn 
through regular courses. A small minority of participants (15%) stated a preference 
for discussion and workshop methods, and one of participant suggested online 
tutorials for learning new skills. This data is reported in Figure 7.9.  The results show 
that the right design has been chosen for the supported tool, as it will fit the need in 
the manner that the users would prefer.   
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7.2.4. Results of Comparison 
7.2.4.1. Results of effectiveness (successfully solved the security issue)  
Since the results of the evaluation experiment were categorical data, cross-tabulation 
analysis was used for data analysis. The task completion results of 79 participants 
were entered into SPSS. The performance of the two groups was compared using 
cross-tabulation, where the two groups were set as rows and the results of the task 
performance were set as a column, as shown in Table 7.1. Figure 7.10 illustrates the 
resulting comparison between the two groups based on the cross-tabulation analysis. 
The results show that 95.0% of participants from the Supported group successfully 
solved the security problem given in the experimental task, which is 77.1% higher 
than the Plain group. All participants in the Supported group reported that they 
performed the task with the help of our tool. 
 
Figure 7-10 Comparing the performance of the experimental task between Supported and Plain 
group 







Count 7 32 39 
% of Total 17.9% 82.1% 100.0% 
Supported 
group 
Count 38 2 40 
% of Total 95.0% 5.0% 100.0% 
Total Count 45 34 79 
% of Total 57.0% 43.0% 100.0% 




Chi-Squared statistics was also used in order to test the hypothesis, ‘H1’, which was 
identified in Section 6.2. The Chi-Squared test (P < 0.001) shows that the results are 
statically significant, as shown in Table 7.2. 
 Chi-Squared Tests 
Value df Asymptotic Significance (2-sided) 
 
Pearson Chi-Squared 47.821a 1 .000 
Continuity Correction 44.730 1 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 55.391 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 79   
Table 7-2 Chi-Squared Test performance of the experimental task using cross-tabulation 
7.2.4.2. Results of effectiveness (Learning outcomes)  
The results of the pre-test and post-test were separately analysed and compared using 
cross-tabulation analysis for both the security problem and solution. 
Understanding the problem 
Table 7.3 compares the pre-test results of the two groups regarding problem 
understanding.  The results show that an insignificant amount of responses were 
correct, which were 7.5% and 5.1% for the Supported and Plain groups, respectively. 
The total percentage of participants who did not know the answer and answered 
incorrectly was 92.5% in the Supported group, which is almost the same as the Plain 
group. The Chi-Squared test (P > 0.05) also shows that the results were statically 
insignificant, as shown in Table 7.4. 
 
 Answers to Pre-test Total 
Correct Don't know Incorrect 
Plain group 
Count 2 15 22 39 
% of Total 5.1% 38.5% 56.4% 100.0% 
Supported group 
Count 3 21 16 40 
% of Total 7.5% 52.5% 40.0% 100.0% 
Total 
Count 5 36 38 79 
% of Total 6.3% 45.6% 48.1% 100.0% 







 Value df Asymptotic Significance (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 2.135a 2 .344 
Likelihood Ratio 2.145 2 .342 
N of Valid Cases 79   
Table 7-4 Chi-Square tests pre-test results for problem understanding using Cross-tabulation 
In terms of analysing the post-test results, the same analysis process as used for the 
pre-test results was followed. Table 7.5 illustrates that almost all participants in the 
Supported group achieved correct answers (92%), which is 66.9% higher than for the 
Plain group. As presented in Table 7.6, the Chi-Square test (P < 0.001) shows that 
the results of the post-test of security problem are statically significant. 
 Answers of Post-test Total 
Correct Don't know Incorrect 
Plain group Count 10 2 27 39 




Count 37 2 1 40 
% of Total 92.5% 5.0% 2.5% 100.0
% 
Total Count 47 4 28 79 
% of Total 59.5% 5.1% 35.4% 100.0
% 
Table 7-5 Post-test results for problem understanding using Cross-tabulation 
Chi-Square Tests 




Likelihood Ratio 46.677 2 .000 
N of Valid Cases 79   
Table 7-6 Chi-Square Tests Post-test results for problem understanding using Cross-tabulation 
 
Understanding the solution 
Table 7.7 shows the results of testing pre-existing knowledge of the security solution 
by comparing the two groups. Only a small minority of both groups’ responses were 
correct, which was around 5%, while 95% of the responses in each group were not 
correct. As presented in Table 7.8, The Chi-Squared test (P > 0.05) shows that the 






 Answers Total 
Correct Don't know Incorrect 
Plain group Count 2 18 19 39 
% of Total 5.1% 46.2% 48.7% 100.0% 
Supported group Count 2 19 19 40 
% of Total 5.0% 47.5% 47.5% 100.0% 
Total Count 4 37 38 79 
% of Total 5.1% 46.8% 48.1% 100.0% 
Table 7-7 Pre-test results for solution understanding using cross-tabulation 
Chi-Squared Tests 
 Value df Asymptotic Significance (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .014a 2 .993 
Likelihood Ratio .014 2 .993 
N of Valid Cases 79   
Table 7-8 Chi-Squared test pre-test results for solution understanding using cross-tabulation 
In contrast, as presented in Table 7.9, the comparison between the two groups’ 
responses shows that 85% of the results of post-test on the security solution were 
correct in Supported group, which was 74.7% higher than for the Plain group. The 
Chi-Squared test (P < 0.001) shows that the results of the security solution post-test 
are statically significant, as shown in Table 7.10. 
 Answers Total 
Correct Don't know Incorrect 
Plain group Count 4 13 22 39 
% of Total 10.3% 33.3% 56.4% 100.0% 
Supported group Count 34 3 3 40 
% of Total 85.0% 7.5% 7.5% 100.0% 
Total Count 38 16 25 79 
% of Total 48.1% 20.3% 31.6% 100.0% 
Table 7-9 Post-test results for solution understanding using cross-tabulation 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymptotic Significance (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 44.369a 2 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 50.142 2 .000 
N of Valid Cases 79   
Table 7-10 Chi-Squared test post-test results for solution understanding using cross-tabulation 
The results show that participants in both groups have similar prior knowledge on 
the problem context and corresponding solution. In contrast, the learning outcomes 




7.2.4.3. Results of efficiency (time)  
The task durations for the 79 participants were recorded and analysed.  Table 7.11 
shows that the mean total time spent by the Supported group (N = 40) was M = 13.65 
minutes (SD = 3.86). By comparison, the mean time taken by the Plain group (N = 
39) was significantly greater at M = 29.3 minutes (SD = 1.49). Since the results are 
numerical data, independent two-sample t-test analysis was used to test the 
hypothesis, ‘H4’, that the mean time of the task duration taken by the two groups was 
statistically significantly different. As can be seen in Table 7.12, there was a 
significant difference in participants’ efficiency in performing the experiment task in 
the Supported group (M = 13.65, SD = 3.86) and the Plain group (M = 29.3, SD = 
1.49); (t (77) = 23.73, P = 0.000 < 0.001). The results show that Supported group 
took less time than Plain group. 




Supported group 40 13.6500 3.86669 .61138 
Plain group 39 29.3846 1.49764 .23981 
Table 7-11 The mean total time taken to complete the experiment task 
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Table 7-12 T-test results for Supported and Plain group efficiency in the experiment task 
7.2.4.4. Results of ease of task (solving the problem)  
The results were analysed in order to compare the difficulties during performing the 
task, which involved understanding the security problem, and finding a solution and 
understanding it, between the two groups.  
Figure 7.11 shows that in the Supported group, a majority of participants (77.5%) 
stated that they had no difficulties in understanding the security problem. Only 5% 




the Plain group (71.8%) reported that they had difficulty in understanding the 
problem.  
Table 7.13 shows that the Supported group demonstrated a significantly less level of 
difficulty in understanding the security problem than Plain group. The Chi-Squared 
test (P < 0.001) also shows that the responses to difficulty in understanding the 
security problem are statically significant, as shown in Table 7.14. 
 
Figure 7-11 Participants’ responses to having difficulty in understanding the security problem 
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26.6% 13.9% 8.9% 11.4% 
100.0
% 
Table 7-13 Participants’ responses to understanding the security problem using cross-tabulation 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymptotic Significance (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 39.896a 4 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 48.757 4 .000 
N of Valid Cases 79   
Table 7-14 Chi-Squared tests results of difficulty in understanding the security problem using cross-
tabulation  
0 5 10 15 20 25
Supported group
Plain group
I have no difficulty in understanding the security problem




Figure 7.12 shows that a large proportion of participants from the Supported group 
(62.5%) had no difficulties in identifying a security solution for the problem. 
However, 10% of the responses expressed some difficulties. The majority of the Plain 
group (82.1%) experienced difficulty in finding a possible solution. Only two out of 
thirty-nine of the participants stated that they had had no difficulty in identifying the 
solution. 
As can be seen in Table 7.15, the responses of the Supported group demonstrated less 
difficulty in finding a solution to solve the security problem than the Plain group. 
Table 7.16 shows the difference between the two groups’ results using the Chi-
Squared test (P < 0.001), which shows that the results are statically significant. 
 
Figure 7-12 Participants’ responses to having difficulty finding a security solution 
Table 7-15 Participants’ responses to finding a possible solution 
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N of Valid Cases 79   
Table 7-16 Chi-Squared test results for difficulty in finding a possible solution 
Regarding the difficulty in understanding the security solution, 29 out of 40 of the 
Supported group reported that they had had no difficulty compared to one participant 
from the Plain group, as shown in Figure 7.13.  
Table 7.17 shows the differences between the groups. The total percentage of the 
Supported group of having difficulties in understanding the solution was 5%, which 
is 76.6% less than for the Plain group. According to the Chi-Squared test (P < 0.001), 
those results are statically significant, as shown in Table 7.18. 
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Table 7-17 Participants’ responses to understanding the solution using cross-tabulation 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value Df Asymptotic Significance (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 55.033a 4 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 69.538 4 .000 
N of Valid Cases 79   
Table 7-18 Chi-Squared test results for difficulty in understanding the solution using cross-
tabulation 
7.3. Subjective Feedback  
This section analyses the subjective data collected from the Supported group. The 
feedback was collected regarding the usability and usefulness of ICS-SES. The 
participants were given the option to use our tool to perform the experiment task. 
Their responses demonstrated that all participants performed the task with the help 
of our tool.  
7.3.1. Evaluation using Cognitive Dimension (CD)  
As discussed in Section 6.3.3.5, the evaluation of ICS-SES’s usability was based on 
the Cognitive Dimension (CD) analytical framework. The six dimensions were 






CD 1- Visibility Dimension 
32 out of 40 of the participants agreed or strongly agreed that “The tool allows access 
to all of the relevant information easily”. There was one participant who disagreed 
with this sentiment, who commented that “Some topics have too much text to read”. 
The suggestions were “consider using different colours and more diagrams”. Since 
too little information will make it difficult to understand and a large portion of the 
participants were pleased with the training material, we decided to not make any 
changes to the training content. 
CD 2- Hard Mental Operations Dimension 
27 out of 40 of the participants agreed or strongly agreed that “The tool aided in 
solving hard or complex problems that would not have been possible in my head”. 
One participant disagreed and argued that “the provided training needs more time to 
be understood, it uses difficult terminology”. After preliminary evaluation, which 
was presented in the last chapter, the training material was already improved by 
providing definitions for all security terms and similar jargon.  
CD 3- Diffuseness Dimension 
The majority of the participants, 33 out of 40, agreed or strongly agreed that “The 
training material provided the full range of information required to solve the 
problem”. Two out of 40 of the participants disagreed, and stated that “more details 
needed in training topics” and “It didn't go in deeper details”. As too much 
information in the training material will undermine the effectiveness of the adaptive 
ICS-SES tool, we decided to not make any changes regarding these comments. 
CD 4- Closeness of mapping Dimension 
31 out of 40 of the participants agreed or strongly agreed that “The tool accurately 
portrays the situation in a context that engineers are familiar with”. There was one 
participant who disagreed with this statement, who commented that “the issue was 
not very complex, I'm not sure if it works with complex systems”. The participant also 
suggested providing more options to solve the problem. This suggestion needs to be 
considered in the future work in order to extend the security patterns catalogue and 




CD 5- Consistency Dimension 
Three-quarters of the participants agreed or strongly agreed that “The information 
provided is consistent across topics”. One participant disagreed with this, though 
without providing any further comments or suggestions related to this dimension. 
 CD 6- Role Expressiveness Dimension 
32 out of 40 of the participants agreed or strongly agreed that “The tool allows me to 
understand why security vulnerabilities occur within engineering designs”. Three 
participants disagreed with this, with the associated feedback being “it was hard to 
know whether training topics are related to the problem or solutions”. This 
recommendation has been accepted by including brief descriptions to introduce the 
material at the beginning of each topic before providing further technical 
explanations.  
 
Figure 7-14 The results of ICS-SES usability evaluation using the Cognitive Dimension (CD) 
CD1: The tool allows me to access all of the relevant information easily, CD2: The tool aided in 
solving hard or complex problems that would not have been possible in my head, CD3: The training 
material provided the full range of information required to solve the problem, CD4: The tool 
accurately portrays the situation in a context engineers are familiar with, CD5: The information 
provided is consistent across topics, CD6: The tool allows me to understand why security 
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7.3.2. Usefulness and Satisfaction   
Figure 7.15 shows the results demonstrating the utility of our tool. Almost all 
participants agreed or strongly agreed that the tool was useful and helped to 
understand the problem and the solution. The majority of participants were pleased 
with the ease of use of the tool. They also expressed the utility of the personal training 
material.  
 
Figure 7-15 The results of ICS-SES usefulness 
U1: Overall it is useful, U2: It helps me to understand the problem, U3: It helps me to understand how 
to solve the problem, U4: The tool is easy to use, U5: The training materials meet my personal needs 
to understand related security topics, U6: The training material is easy to understand, U7: The tool 
can help developers in designing secure control systems 
Figure 7.16 shows the results associated with user satisfaction. Most participants 
expressed their satisfaction with the tool and the support training material. 
Approximately half of participants agreed or strongly agreed that they needed to use 
the tool to design more secure systems. A large proportion of the participants agreed 
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Figure 7-16 The results of ICS-SES user satisfaction 
S1: I am satisfied with it, S2: I need to use it to design more secure systems, S3: I am satisfied with 
the support training material, S4: I can use it easily every day at work without undue distraction. 
 
7.4. Participants’ engagement with security training  
This section presents the results of the Google Analytics tool that was used to analyse 
the user engagement with the training material. The researcher created a Google 
Analytics account, and inserted the associated tracking code into the training sites 
that presented the training content to be monitored. Participants engagement data was 
collected and quantitively analysed by Google Analytics. Google Analytics 
automatically generates a range of reports that can be accessed via the account 
webpage (Hasan et al., 2009). Only results that provided an overview of user traffic 
and engagement were considered in terms of monitoring their training activities. The 
results related to the training topics including five main pages were extracted, as 
shown in Table 7.19. The results illustrate that all participants viewed the 
vulnerability training topic. 33 out of 40 of the participants viewed the Access 
Control training page. The less-viewed training pages were those of Authentication 
and Authorisation, which were viewed by 22 and 17 of the participants, respectively. 
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Training Pages Unique page views 
Unauthorised access vulnerability  40 
Access control 33 
Authentication  22 
Authorisation 17 
Role-Based Access Control 36 
Table 7-19 The results of user engagement with training material 
7.5. Plain group experience 
The results of the Plain group demonstrated that, overall, participants experienced 
difficulties in performing the tasks, mostly in understanding the problem and finding 
and understanding appropriate solutions. One participant described the greatest 
difficulty as that of being “unfamiliar with terminology”. 
Figure 7.17 shows that 80% of participants stated that there was some difficulty in 
finding related information about the problem and how to solve it. 82.5% of the 
participants disagreed or strongly disagreed with this: “I found required information 
that meet my personal needs to understand related security topics”. Only one out of 
39 of the participants agreed with this statement. 
 
Figure 7-17 Plain group experience on performing the experiment task. 
D1: I easily found related information about the problem, D2: I easily found related information about 
how to solve the problem, D3: I found required information that meet my personal needs to understand 

















As it can be seen in Figure 7.18, 90% of participants expressed their need to 
understand the problem and the need for guidance with security design. 2.5% of 
responses stated that there is no need for security understanding or guidance. A large 
proportion of the participants (77.5%) agreed or strongly agreed that they needed to 
improve their security knowledge; 10% of participants disagreed with the need to 
improve such knowledge. Almost all participants agreed or strongly agreed that they 
needed personal training material that meet their needs; only 2.5% of the participants 
disagreed. 82.5% of the participants agreed or strongly agreed that they needed 
greater support in designing secure systems; 2.5% of the participants disagreed. 
 
Figure 7-18 Plain group’s need to solve the problem. 
N1: I need to understand the problem, N2: I need to improve my security skills, N3: I need guidance 
to solve the security problem in the system model, N4: I need training material that meets my needs 
in the problem context, N5: I need more support in designing secure systems. 
 
7.6. Internal and External Threats  
This section discusses potential threats that could influence the dependent variables 
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7.6.1. Internal Validity  
The internal validity of an experiment is “the validity of inferences about whether 
observed co-variation between A (the presumed treatment) and B (the presumed 
outcome) reflects a causal relationship from A to B as those variables were 
manipulated or measured” (Shadish et al., 2002).  
In this section, internal validity is discussed in relation to the cause-effect 
relationships induced by this experiment. Selection effects, there was no selection 
effect in this experiment as the participants were randomly assigned to the two 
groups. In addition, the results of the pre-test showed that each of the groups had 
almost the same background. Maturity effects, the boredom threat was controlled by 
having only one experimental task and limiting its duration to half an hour. Learning 
effects, there was no learning effect in our experiment because there was only one 
treatment. We did not use cross-over trials (Stoner, 2004) in the experiment to avoid 
any learning effect. Testing effects, all participants attended the same familiarisation 
tutorial and all were given the same material except the treatment. There might be 
cheating because the participants were in the same place; however, we controlled for 
this by having two tutors monitoring the participants at all times and by asking them 
to work independently. Instrument effects, there were no instrument effects in this 
experiment as the participants were given the same experimental task. As mentioned 
earlier in Chapter 6, two graphical tools were developed for the two groups to ensure 
that all participants worked within the same development environment.  
7.6.2. External Validity  
External validity was concerned with the extent to which the findings of our study 
could be generalised. Subjects, these concerns were addressed by selecting a good 
sample size of engineers, as discussed in Chapter 6, Section 6.3.5. Although some 
experimenters argue that recruiting students might in itself be a threat to validity, 
many studies have showed that there is no difference between students and 
professionals (Sjøberg et al., 2005). Environment, the environment effect was 
avoided by conducting the experiment at the same time in the same place. Task-
related threats, the experiment task was representative of industrial practice as it was 




in the design of the control systems. The duration of the task might also be considered 
a threat. However, we believe that the task duration was suitable as it was set based 
on the preliminary results of the experiment.   
7.7. Discussion  
A controlled experiment was conducted to evaluate the usability of the ICS-SES tool 
in terms of effectiveness, efficiency, and ease of task in helping developers to design 
secure control systems. The results obtained from the background questionnaire 
show that our tool meets a particular need as 81% of participants rate their cyber 
security knowledge as poor or very poor. The results revealed that participants lacked 
security training, which explains the result of their poor knowledge on ICS security 
issues, security standards and guidelines. Despite the existing security guidelines and 
best security design practise, which are published by several institutions and cyber 
security leaders worldwide, system engineers are not aware of these guidelines and 
methodologies. These findings are consistent with the results obtained from the 
qualitative study presented in Chapter 4.   
Although participants have some awareness of the importance of considering security 
engineering throughout the system developing cycle, they are not aware of their role 
in building secure systems. However, the results show that participants are highly 
motivated to learn how to improve their security knowledge, particularly during their 
work. Moreover, the results from Google Analytics showed that the participants are 
highly engaged with the security training material, which is consistent with the results 
of participants’ motivations towards improving their knowledge.    
The performance results also show that participants will be better able to mitigate 
security vulnerabilities and reasoning regarding the appropriate secure design pattern 
with the help of the ICS-SES tool. Therefore, hypothesis H1 “Participants will be 
better able to solve a security problem in a system model with the help of ICS-SES 
tool” is accepted.  
The result of knowledge assessment demonstrates that ICS-SES assists the 
improvement of the knowledge of participants, and makes it easier to perform the 
task of security engineering in comparison with the Plain group experience. 




security problem with the support of the ICS-SES tool”, hypothesis H3 “Participants 
will better understand the security solution with the help of the ICS-SES tool” and 
hypothesis H4 “the difficulty of solving the security problem will be less with the 
help of the ICS-SES tool”. 
In terms of efficiency, the result was significantly different (P < 0.001) as the 
participants take 52.16% less time to complete the task while using ICS-SES tool 
than the Plain group. Therefore, hypothesis H5 that “The time taken to solve the 
security problem given in the scenario will be less when using the ICS-SES tool” can 
be accepted. 
The subjective feedback shows that the ICS-SES tool is generally useful and capable 
of being used within the work environment. Also, the participants were generally 
satisfied with the experience of the supported method. Engineer’s subjective 
feedback regarding ICS-SES was positive, which is consistent with the results of the 
quantitative analysis.    
The results obtained from the Cognitive Dimensions and subjective feedback 
revealed a list of suggestions to improve ICS-SES. Participants’ recommendations 
were considered as potential improvements to the ICS-SES design.  
7.8. Conclusion  
This chapter introduced the evaluation of ICS-SES. A controlled experiment was 
executed in the Faculty of Technology at De Montfort University. 79 engineering 
students with different levels of education participated in the experiment. The ICS-
SES tool was evaluated in terms of performance, effectiveness, efficiency and the 
ease of task. The data was collected, imported into the SPSS software suite and 
analysed. 
The results of background survey clearly demonstrated that ICS developers lack 
security knowledge and training. However, the developers were motivated to learn 
and improve their knowledge through on-the-job training method. In addition, the 
results obtained from the comparison of the learning outcomes show the 
effectiveness of on-the-job-training support used in our tool and the results were 




The results obtained from the quantitative analysis of this study were presented in 
relation to the study hypotheses, as discussed in Section 7.7:   
Hypothesis H1 “Participants will be better able to solve a security problem in a 
system model with the help of ICS-SES tool” is accepted. 
Hypothesis H2 “Participants will better understand the security problem with the 
support of the ICS-SES tool” is accepted. 
Hypothesis H3 “Participants will better understand the security solution with the help 
of the ICS-SES tool” is accepted.  
Hypothesis H4“the difficulty of solving the security problem will be less with the 
help of the ICS-SES tool” is accepted.  
Hypothesis H5“The time taken to solve the security problem given in the scenario 
will be less when using the ICS-SES tool” is accepted. 
The subjective feedback showed that the ICS-SES tool is generally useful and the 
users’ feedback was positive.  








This thesis presents a framework, Industrial Control System Security Engineering 
Support (ICS-SES), to assist developers in security engineering at the control system 
design phase. This chapter draws conclusions from both qualitative study that 
explored control system developers’ needs for security engineering, and empirical 
study that examined the usability of the ICS-SES supported framework. The 
reminder of this chapter discusses the research contributions and outlines possible 
new directions for future work.  
8.1. Conclusions 
The thesis hypothesis is “Technology can be used to support developers in designing 
secure control systems and improve their security knowledge.” The resulting 
supported framework was defined as the Industrial Control Systems Security 
Engineering Support, ‘ICS-SES’. The argument is that ICS-SES can assist engineers 
to develop secure control systems. ICS-SES is usable and can effectively help 
developers to improve their security knowledge and design secure control systems. 
Based on academic and industrial motivation, discussed in Chapter 1.2, and the 
findings from the qualitative study on ICS developers’ needs regarding security 
engineering, as discussed in Chapter 4, the ICS-SES framework was proposed in 
Chapter 5, with the aim of supporting the development of control system security by 
design. In particular, it guides users in mitigating any detected security flaws in a 
system model and provides adaptive training material tailored to users’ needs. The 
framework was evaluated through empirical study, as presented in Chapter 6, by 
assessing its usability in assisting engineers to develop secure control systems in 
terms of effectiveness, efficiency and ease of task. An empirical study with a group 
of seventy-nine engineers with different educational levels found that the ICS-SES 
tool can improve security awareness and knowledge and help to solve design security 
problems with fewer difficulties in a reduced amount of time, as discussed in Chapter 




8.1.1. Research question 1 
The answer to research question 1 “What is the state-of-the-art in control system 
security engineering?” was obtained by conducting qualitative studies. In Chapter 2, 
the related literature was systematically reviewed. This study revealed that there is a 
knowledge gap in the control system security engineering research area that requires 
greater attention from researchers. The literature ascertained that including security 
over the entire development life cycle is paramount to building secure control 
systems that are resistant to attack. The study findings clearly demonstrated that 
control system development processes lack security considerations. It also showed 
that control system developers lack security awareness and knowledge, and thus that 
there is a culture gap between system developers and security experts. This gap was 
better understood and explained through the results of the research interviews 
conducted with control system developers, as examined in Chapter 4. The results of 
these interviews showed that developers lack technical and training support in terms 
of security. Lack of knowledge and support were also confirmed from the results of 
the empirical study presented in Chapter 7. As a result, control system security 
engineering is still not sufficient and more effort is needed from researchers to bridge 
the gap between control system developers and security experts.  
8.1.2. Research question 2 
Research question 2 “What are developers’ needs regarding the design of secure 
control systems?” was answered by the results obtained from the exploratory 
research interviews studied in Chapter 4. A qualitative study was conducted to assess 
developers’ support needs for the design of secure systems. In line with the results of 
the systematic literature review, the study findings revealed two key reasons for the 
lack of security consideration throughout the system development cycle: lack of 
knowledge and lack of support. In addition, the results gave further insights into 
developers’ requirements in terms of developing system security by design. Control 
system developers do not consider security requirements throughout the system 
design phase; the focus is purely on functionality and safety. However, developers 
have some awareness of the necessity of security and showed a readiness to improve 




experimental study presented in Chapter 7. The study results revealed that control 
system engineers need both technical support that can assist in developing control 
system security by design, and training support that provides fundamental required 
security knowledge.   
8.1.3. Research question 3 
The answer to research question 3 “Can an on-the-job adaptive training tool be 
created to support control system security by design?” is yes. In Chapter 5, an 
adaptive supported framework was created and named ‘Industrial Control System 
Security Engineering Support (ICS-SES)’, which included a pattern-based security 
guide and tailored security training. A prototyping tool for ICS-SES was created with 
an emphasis on these two main functionalities in order to evaluate the feasibility of 
our supported method. After the preliminary evaluation presented in Chapter 6, 
Chapter 7 evaluated the improved ICS-SES tool by conducting a controlled 
experiment with a large user group, consisting of seventy-nine engineers, to find out 
whether ICS-SES can help developers to improve their knowledge and design secure 
control systems. The results showed that almost all participants were pleased with 
the tool’s support and expressed their feelings that the tool helped to solve and 
understand security problems.   
8.1.4. Research question 4 
Research question 4, “Can a supported tool assist developers in designing secure 
control systems?” was successfully answered through the work performed in Chapter 
7. The usability of the ICS-SES tool was evaluated by conducting an empirical study, 
presented in Chapter 6, using seventy-nine engineers with a variety of educational 
levels. Participants were divided into two groups: the experimental group, which 
used the ICS-SES tool, and the control group, which did not. The two groups were 
compared in terms of participants’ abilities to understand the security problem 
context (the security flaw in the system model provided in the experiment task), 
reasoning regarding security patterns to solve the problem, efficiency in identifying 
an appropriate security pattern to mitigate the security weakness, and the ease of the 
task of finding a suitable solution to the problem. We were able to obtain statistically 




group using the ICS-SES tool performed better than the control group. We were able 
to obtain statically significant efficiency (time) differences between the two groups. 
The group with ICS-SES spent less time performing the task than the control group. 
We were also able to obtain statically significant differences as to the ease of 
performing the task, and noted that the group with the supported tool found it easier. 
In addition, the subjective feedback obtained showed that participants were pleased 
with the supported tool and their overall commentary regarding ICS-SES was 
positive.   
8.2. Contributions  
A novel method to support designing secure industrial control systems. The ICS-SES 
method brings together patterns from security expertise and serves them to system 
developers in an interactive manner. It also contributes to education process in terms 
of security, as it provides a systematic way to educate system developers in secure 
design patterns. This has implications for improving the security of industrial control 
system design.   
An on-the-job practical guide for security patterns in combination with training aid. 
A security patterns guide has been proposed by a number of researchers (Weiss and 
Mouratidis, 2008) (Hasheminejad and Jalili, 2009) (Fernandez et al., 2011) using 
different pattern classifications. However, this is the first method that provides a 
practical and systematic guide on reasoning about security patterns through an on-
the-job approach combined with tailored security training material.  
On-the-job security training in the control engineering discipline. The on-the-job 
training approach is commonly used in the engineering field as engineers typically 
learn through practice, by ‘doing’ or observing at the work site (Rooney et al., 2014). 
ICS-SES contributes to control engineering education by employing this approach to 
educate engineers in security engineering. There is further contribution from the use 
of a problem-based learning strategy, which has been applied in engineering 
education for many years in a variety of professional engineering schools (Jonassen 





Contextualised and personalised security training for industrial control systems. 
ICS-SES provides security training material that is adaptive to the system design 
security problem context and tailored to users’ training needs by employing an 
automated planner technique. Traditionally, automated planners have been used in e-
learning course design in combination with Case-Based Reasoning (CBR) to save 
predefined learning plans in a library, where learning plans are recurrent (Garrido et 
al., 2012). However, our method uses an automated planner to interactively generate 
learning plans that are different from one trainee to another within a given work 
environment; we have not been able to identify similar use anywhere in the area of 
security.     
The potential for improving security awareness and knowledge of control system 
engineers. Through an experimental study conducted in this research, it was found 
that ICS-SES helps engineers to improve their security skills and transfer lessons 
learned through ICS-SES to similar problems. This finding shows that the ICS-SES 
contributes to security education. 
Improving comprehension of control system security. Through an experimental study 
conducted in this research, it was found that ICS-SES can help to reduce difficulties 
in understanding control system vulnerabilities and related security solutions, and 
further that our results are statically significant. ICS-SES contributes to helping 
tackle the difficulties faced by control engineers in the field of security engineering. 
It also helps improve the usability of security standards and guidelines in practice.   
8.3. Directions for Future Work 
Whilst this thesis has demonstrated the potential for effectively improving industrial 
control system security engineering by providing an educational supported method, 
there are still opportunities for extending the scope of this research. This section 
discusses a number of such possible directions.   
As a part of the ICS-SES process, the tool uses users’ feedback, which is collected 
after pattern application and assessment in the Case-Based Security Patterns (CBSP), 
so as to enhance the pattern selection process. Future work can address the impact of 




extended to consider impact restrictions in the selection algorithm used in order to be 
compatible with aspects of system functionality.  
The ICS-SES tool was based on an automated planning technique in order to provide 
security training support. While the current training aid has achieved significant 
positive results during the tool evaluation phase, the tool could be further extended 
to apply an approach for monitoring the execution of training plans that could help 
to improve their validity. Trainees can be monitored to avoid any incidents that might 
occur during training regarding their performance, such as many trainees being 
unable to achieve topic competence, or efficiency, such as trainees taking a longer 
time than expected to complete a particular training topic.    
Currently, the ICS-SES tool supports control system developers at the design phase. 
Future work could focus on supporting security engineering during other 
development phases. For example, in software engineering, there is an educational 
tool named ESIDE, as proposed in reference (Pilkington et al., 2009), that can help 
software engineers to write secure code. Future work could adapt this tool to be 
compatible with the nature of control systems to support the implementation of 
secure control systems.  
8.4. Closing remarks 
This work reveals that it is possible to develop industrial control system security by 
design by supporting system developers and improving their security knowledge. In 
this thesis, the Industrial Control System Security Engineering Support (ICS-SES) 
framework was proposed, with the aim of assisting developers in the design of 
control systems through pattern-based security guides and personalised security 
training support. The empirical evaluation study shows that ICS-SES can help to 
develop control system security by design and improve developers’ security 
awareness and knowledge. The experience gained from this PhD project provides 
sufficient foundation work to generalise the use of this supported method in the 
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Appendix C: Research Interviews (Appendix to Chapter 4) 
 
C 1. Interview Questions 
 
Introduction 
The main purpose of this interview is to collect qualitative data that would explore 
the current security knowledge of control system developers and identify their 
security training needs. This interview structured as it is shown in the following 
table. 
 
Section 1: Security awareness and knowledge 
Q1- What are security issues related to Industrial Control Systems field? 
  
Q2- In your opinion, at which phase of development cycle security 
concerns should be involved?  
 
Q3- How do you determine whether your system design is secure? 
 
Q4- From your perspective, what are the most important security rules 
that developers should follow in order to design secure systems? 
 
Q5- Example discussion  
 
If you design this 




If you design your system using SysML, use 
Example 1 
If you do not use SysML, use Example 2  
Q6- Do you know secure design patterns or guidelines? 
 
Section 2: Available support for ICS security engineering 
Q7- How do you select the security patterns? 







Q9- Have you attended 
any security training 
program? 
 
YES 9.1 Did that training help you to 
improve your security awareness and 
design secure systems?  
  
NO 9.2 Do you think you need security 
training? Why? 
 
Section 3: Developers’ needs and requirements for designing 
secure systems 
Q10- What kind of support could improve security knowledge of control 
engineers? 
 
Q11- What are features that would make a training tool more useful for 
engineers? 
 
Q12- What are features of training tools that distract from learning? 
  
 
























Tool doesn’t support applying security.  
Sysml doesn’t include security information. 
I cannot model security.  
Tool doesn’t support security.  
Security should be at the beginning of the design stage  
the problem none of the tools allow you to do that 
The focus is on control not on security 
in the past security wasn’t an issue 
The connectivity 
Connectivity to the internet 
Connectivity carries risk  
engineers and operators.  
Protocols are not secure 
Industrial internet of things (industry 4.0) 
multi layers of security need to be investigated 
The key is connectivity  
Systems that controlled from central point of view 
Security is complex 
The connectivity leads to security concerns 
The access should be limited 
The main issue is how to stay up to date 
The gap between engineers and security experts 
structure and operation security issues 
The key is system structure 
using ready protocols  
unable to customise or modify protocols 
dealing with safety only 
difficult to say what is vulnerable and where can consider security 
systems should be secure 
the background is far away from security 
haven’t used security patterns 
Engineers don’t have knowledge in security 
no check against security 
System is tested just for functionality and performance 
the rely is on other security like PC protection and firewalls 
no security measurements 
Engineers should have a good knowledge on security 
Not aware of security patterns /standards 
Security should be implemented at the beginning. 
 Security can be added at the end 
Engineers based on vendors for security 
Measurement is for safety only 




Engineers don’t have security background 
Don’t need training support.  
Engineers care about functionality more than security 
Support should be during work 
Engineers should understand security basics and principles 
available training is very general 
Workshops with industry are general 
No security training 
No security in engineering education. p4 
available training is not specific for design. P5 
have never been thought how to protect control systems  
Every engineer should have security awareness. 
security knowledge should be improved 
Security training is important 
training can make everybody implement security  
Engineers should have a good knowledge on security 
Regular courses are good for security training 
having more control of security  
need tool that gives a capability to implement security 
Provide examples  
Explain technical details 
provide challenges and exercise 
trying not only reading 
avoid too much text 
know the consequences or risks of vulnerability 
system designers should be connected with security experts 
Engineers should work together with security experts 
Explain and describe the problem and risks 
Avoid anonymous information 
Avoid unclear messages 
System designers is the key of control system security 
Avoid security jargon  
Use standards 
Training must be based on prior knowledge 
Provide suggestion to choose from 
tools only give feedback about problem 
explain how to fix problem 
engineers need security training 
Engineers need automated support 
Save our time 
good simulation 
Drag and drop 
A good GUI.  
Good layout 
Provide help and assistance 
Provide high level and conceptual explanation 
Simple and effective 




provide personal support 
Don’t bother 
Regular training 
educate engineers in system weaknesses 
Provide support to improve security 
Tool should be easy to use 
Provide clear steps and explanation help 
suggested some solutions. P6 
User friendly interface 
Provide a template of solution 
Tool that can be used and configured 
provide solutions according to the problem 
Give some description on how solutions work 
Provide learning material 
Use domain specific language 





Appendix D : The empirical experiment (Appendix to Chapter 6) 
















































































































D.5 System Description 
The system is an industrial hatchery. The hatchery consists of seven incubators, five 
setters and two hatchers. Each incubator can hold up to 115200 eggs. Eggs are 
initially put in one of the setter incubators, where they are turned hourly. Then they 
get transferred to the hatcher incubators to hatch. Each incubator consists of various 
sensors and actuators that are connected to a PLC (Setter1PLC,Setter2PLC, 
Setter3PLC, Setter4PLC, Setter5PLC, Hatcher1PLC, Hatcher2PLC). At the 
front of the incubator a touchscreen is used for monitoring and controlling the 
parameters (Setter1Screen, Setter2Screen, Setter3Screen, Setter4Screen, 
Setter5Screen, Hatcher1Screen, Hatcher2Screen). Each incubator room has a 
switch that all PLCs in that room are connected to (SetterSwitch, HatcherSwitch). 
This switch is connected to a wireless router (SetterRouter, HatcherRouter) which 
can be used for accessing the incubators with a mobile device, using an app that can 
take control of the touchscreens. The room switches are all connected to a switch in 
a centralized location (HatcherySwitch). In this location, you also find a server 
(CentralServer) that is used by the manufacturer to connect to the hatchery 
remotely. There is also an industrial PC (HatcheryPC) that logs all the data and can 
be used to control all incubators.   
There are currently four different types of users in the hatchery. The least privileged 
users can look at the different parameters, but not change them. Additionally, they 
can reset the incubator alarms or turn off the sound. This is meant for technicians 
(Technician). The second lowest level is used by the operators (Operator) of the 
hatchery. This user group can change all parameters of the incubators, including the 
temperature settings, humidity, CO2 levels, etc. The local managers (Manager) make 
up the third level. They are able to do all the above, as well as change operator 
passwords, export data regarding login lists and alarms to USB, and so on. The 
highest level is reserved for the manufacturer (EMKA) of the incubators. When they 
log on remotely using their password, they also get access to additional information 
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